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Summary. – Education is a goal-oriented field. But if we want to treat education scientifically 
so we can accumulate, evaluate, and refine what we learn, then we must develop a theoretical 
framework that is strongly rooted in objective observations and through which different 
theoretical models of student thinking can be compared. Much that is known in the behavioral 
sciences is robust and observationally based. In this paper, I draw from a variety of fields 
ranging from neuroscience to sociolinguistics to propose an over-arching theoretical 
framework that allows us to both make sense of what we see in the classroom and to compare 
a variety of specific theoretical approaches. My synthesis is organized around an analysis of 
the individual’s cognition and how it interacts with the environment. This leads to a two level 
system, a knowledge-structure level where associational patterns dominate, and a control-
structure level where one can describe expectations and epistemology. For each level, I sketch 
some plausible starting models for student thinking and learning in physics and give examples 
of how a theoretical orientation can affect instruction and research. 
1 – Motivation and Introduction 
1.1 : Identifying a Theoretical Framework 
Education research is an applied field. As educators, we want to understand how teaching 
and learning works in order to be able to teach our students more effectively. As scientists, we 
would like to do this using a scientific approach that combines observation, analysis, and 
synthesis like the one that has been so effective in helping us make sense of the physical 
world. Such a synthesis helps transform a collection of independent “facts” into a coherent 
science, capable of evaluating, refining, and making sense of our accumulated experimental 
data. However, education research differs from traditional physics research in that in 
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education our goals often dominate our view of the system we are trying to understand.*  We 
never want to lose sight of our goals, but we very much want to treat our system scientifically 
in order to understand how it functions. Indeed, if we better understand how the system 
functions, we can better articulate and refine our goals. Moreover, we might be able to 
explain just what it is that highly successful teachers do and transform what is presently an art 
into a teachable science. At present, despite a few researchers who discuss theoretical frames, 
research and development in education is strongly dominated by observation and by direct 
educational goals: “What do we have to do to get our students to learn more effectively?” 
But science is not just a collection of observations: “These students do thus in these 
circumstances.”  In building a science we depend heavily on the idea of mechanism – 
describing the behavior of a system in terms of a small number of objects or variables. Such a 
description tells us what we are talking about and how we are going to think about it. I refer 
to this choice of objects and variables as our ontology.  
Seeking mechanism is not just reductionism, though reductionism (description of a system 
in terms of the behavior of fundamental constituent parts and their interactions) can often 
provide mechanism. Sometimes in physics we create collective variables – like Cooper pairs, 
phonons, pressure, or temperature.†  We try to isolate “what matters” in describing a physical 
system so as to produce an optimal description – one in which the system and its behavior are 
described by a minimal number of concepts and one in which the complex behavior of the 
system arises from combinations and elaborations of the simple structures and their 
interactions. 
If we are going to try to study education using the tools and methods of science, we need 
to develop a theoretical framework – a shared language and shared assumptions that can both 
guide and allow us to compare different approaches and ways of thinking. An example of a 
theoretical framework in atomic, molecular, and condensed matter physics is the theory 
describing matter as electrons and nuclei satisfying a many-body non-relativistic Schrödinger 
equation with Coulomb and (first order) radiative electromagnetic interactions. Although this 
framework is widely believed to provide highly accurate descriptions of atoms, molecules, 
and matter, it can in actual fact only be used to calculate the properties of a very small 
number of systems (hydrogen, helium, the H2+ ion, etc.).  
Calculating more complex systems requires a model – a starting point for the description 
of the complex system that assumes a simplified structure for the behavior of most of the 
particles in the system. The atomic shell model is one example. The Bloch waves and Fermi 
surface model of electrons in a crystal is another. Each of these models is constrained by and 
guided by the over-arching theoretical framework and their imbedding in that framework may 
                                                          
*   We should not ignore the fact that a practical goal is implicitly imbedded in much of traditional 
science: the goal of learning how to control our environment. There is a continual tension between 
basic and applied science that arises from the inevitable imbedding of science in a social context.  
†   What is a collective variable and what is fundamental can change depending on our theoretical frame. 
An electric field is fundamental in a classical picture. In a photon picture it is a collective variable. 
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permit the calculation of corrections to the model or the calculation of the model’s 
phenomenological parameters (if it has any).  
In physics, we tend to refer to theoretical structures that address a fairly narrow range of 
phenomena, such as the low-lying energy levels of atoms or nuclei, as models. We call the 
broader dynamical framework in which these models are imbedded as theories. In education 
(and in cognitive science), the tendency is to refer to the former as theories (e.g., the theory of 
small-group social interaction, or the modular theory of students’ senses of physical 
phenomena) and the latter as a theoretical framework. For this paper, I will use the physics 
terminology, but modify “theory” to “theoretical framework” when I want to stress the 
incompleteness of the structure.  
In this paper, I propose the outline of a few components of a theory appropriate for 
thinking about how teen-agers and young adults learn physics. Into this framework I collect 
and propose some appropriate models in the hopes of encouraging a dialog on theoretical 
issues. My goal is to try to help the community begin to establish a few foothold ideas by 
seeking common ground among distinct models. Our theoretical frame and the models I 
describe in what follows synthesize and extend a number of good ideas that have been known 
both to researchers and some teachers for many years. A major part of trying to develop a 
theoretical structure is to be able to go beyond the “tips and guidelines” that successful 
teachers and researchers provide us and to see how to fit these suggestions into a broader and 
more coherent structure that can be explained and transferred to others. 
1.2 Constructing a Theoretical Framework 
Where in the complex system of students in a classroom should we begin to construct a 
theoretical framework? The education of a student is an immensely complex issue. Each 
student is an individual with a complex mental structure and responses. Those mental 
structures have been formed by the interaction of the individual’s genetic possibility with 
their environmental development. In addition, each individual lives in many cultures and is 
educated in many social environments that play a major role in what the student learns (and 
does not learn). 
Three broad issues play major roles in learning, even for a single individual: the 
development of the individual’s mental system, the behavior and functioning of the 
individual, and the interaction of the individual to respond to and help create a social 
environment. Each of these issues has been studied extensively and much is known. In this 
overview, I choose to focus on what appears to me to be the central issue: the behavior and 
functioning of individual adults – high school and college students – particularly in the 
context of the learning of science (and of that, particularly learning physics, from which most 
of my examples will be drawn). Developmental issues, while playing a role in establishing the 
structures observed in the individual, are indirectly related to the educational issues we are 
interested in here. Socio-cultural issues, however, play a critical role. Every adult’s thinking 
processes have been shaped by being raised within a culture and these processes both respond 
to and shape the cultural environments in which individuals find themselves. It is possible – 
and valuable – to view the individual as part of a social system of a variety of grain sizes. 
This adds an further complexity to the issue of understanding how an individual thinks. For a 
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discussion of some of these issues, see Otero’s paper in this volume and the references there. 
[1] 
In this paper, I only address socio-cultural issues “from the inside” – that is, from the 
point of view of the individual and how the individual’s cognition responds to both the socio-
cultural and physical environments. Even if we are primarily interested in socio-cultural 
phenomena, what is learned from the individual cognitive perspective should be useful. When 
considering a system of objects, it is often helpful to understand the character and behavior of 
the individual objects in the system. 
If we restrict our theoretical framework to the cognition of the adult individual and how 
he responds to his physical and social environment, where do we begin? We are trying to 
describe one of the most complex systems known on earth: human behavior. This is not 
rocket science – it’s MUCH harder. To see how hard, we can describe the system in physics 
terms: It is a strongly interacting many-body system in which observations change the system 
in uncontrollable ways. We therefore want to be modest in what we try to achieve at this 
stage, but to rely as much as possible on what has been learned. Since phenomenological 
modeling of human behavior in education and psychology is sometimes “all over the lot” I 
rely heavily on a triangulation through results in multiple fields: fundamental cognitive 
research, neuroscience, and research on real people doing real tasks in real situations.*  This 
last involves many disciplines including, educational research, ethology, sociology, 
anthropology, and sociolinguistics. I organize this into three levels: neuroscience, cognitive 
science, and the phenomenological observational sciences of human behavior. 
As a physicist, I naturally tend to be a reductionist: I want to be able to conceive of 
mechanisms underlying the phenomena I describe even if the connection is difficult or 
somewhat obscure. Since the brain is composed of biological components – particularly 
neurons – the study of the mechanical functioning of this system strikes me as having 
relevance, even if we are far from understanding how thought and understanding arise from 
biological processes. Neuroscientists have begun to build an understanding of the biological 
mechanisms that underlie some aspects of human behavior – analogous to building a 
statistical mechanics of the collective variables determined by the psychological 
phenomenologists. [2][3][4] I review some basic results of neuroscience in section 2. 
But it is not appropriate at this stage (or perhaps at any stage in the foreseeable future) to 
attempt a reductionist description of human behavior.† What we want is to construct a mid-
level set of collective variables – a mesoscopic thermodynamics of thinking – that provides a 
useful ontology for constructing mechanisms. 
Fundamental cognitive research attempts to investigate the underlying ontology and 
mechanisms of the human mind – to “carve the mind at its joints.”[5][6][7] Since the mind is 
extremely complex and is often able to compensate for deficiencies in one area by 
                                                          
*   This kind of research is referred to as ecological in psychology. 
†  To keep reductionism in perspective, there are ~105 neurons and ~109 synapses per cubic millimeter 
of brain tissue. Furthermore, the system cannot be treated statistically since there is considerable 
organization – though not necessarily on the neuron by neuron level. [4] 
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repurposing or reinterpreting data from other areas, there are rarely single identifiable causes 
for any given response. To attempt to isolate mechanisms, research psychologists create 
experiments that may appear highly contrived, such as ones measuring time delays of 
milliseconds in responses, saccadic eye motions, or a subject’s ability to recall nonsense 
syllables. As a physicist, I recognize these kinds of experiments and feel quite comfortable 
with their design, in principle, if not in detail; they are zero-friction experiments. In physics, 
in the effort to isolate mechanisms we often go to great efforts to suppress phenomena that are 
present in every real-world situation and that may play a critical role in what actually 
happens. Our enhanced understanding of underlying mechanisms allows us to re-interpret 
what we see in the real world in a more coherent fashion. But we have to be very careful to 
“put the friction back” before drawing practical conclusions. A small number of elements 
from the large body of cognitive science results are summarized in section 3. 
In order to understand how students build new knowledge and how students respond to 
different classroom contexts, I use information from these two fundamental sciences to 
categorize behavior into two broad areas: association and control. In each of these areas I 
outline a theoretical framework and then discuss a few of the models that have been proposed 
that fit nicely in this structure and that are relevant for the teaching and learning of physics. In 
section 4 I discuss associational patterns: knowledge structures, cognitive resources, and their 
patterns of association. In section 5 I discuss control: epistemology, expectations, and 
framing. In section 6 I consider applications of this theoretical structure to instruction and to 
research. Section 7 discusses some conclusions. Since I am building by synthesis by 
combining many different areas of research, terminology can be a problem. Different areas of 
research use the same term in different ways (as, indeed, do competing researchers in the 
same research area.). To provide some concreteness and clarification, in section 8 I provide of 
glossary of terms. 
2  – The starting point: a foothold in neuroscience 
Our starting point in building our theoretical framework is the assumption that underlies 
the operation of “normal science.”[8] 
Principle 1: (Working hypothesis) All phenomena are describable as arising from the 
fundamental physical objects and laws that we know. 
Of course, we don’t know all physical laws and objects, but we know a lot. Our principle 1 
suggests that we assume that there is no “new physics” until we are forced to do so by the 
data. Thus, we should not assume ab initio that organic chemistry requires a fundamentally 
different treatment of atoms in molecules than inorganic chemistry. In the case of cognition, 
the principle of “trying to do normal science first” says that we should assume: 
Principle 2: All cognition takes place as a result of the functioning of neurons in the 
individual’s brain.  
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This means that we will not assume a “mind” or “spirit” that is somehow superposed on and 
different from the functioning of a brain’s neurons. [9] In the spirit of normal science we will 
hold to this assumption until forced to modify it by extensive data.*  
2.1 The basic ideas of neuroscience 
At present, neural research suggests that knowledge and learning are carried by the set of 
neurons of an individual’s brain and their connections. Neurons are cells that have long 
cylindrical protuberances (dendrites and axons) that are electrically active and that connect to 
other neurons (and to sensors and muscles) at their ends (synapses). (See figure 1.) 
 
Fig. 1: Neurons and neural connections. From [11], p. 1228 (courtesy, B. Alberts). 
In 0th approximation, dendrites and axons are basically long thin cylindrical capacitors. 
They maintain a potential difference across their inner and outer membranes. When the cell is 
activated, the cylinder discharges axially in a small region and this region of localized 
discharge runs down the cylinder. This phenomenon is called an action potential and requires 
active electrical mechanisms to produce it. As shown in figure 2, an activated cell produces a 
chain of action potentials. The information carried by this signal appears to be contained 
mostly in the rate at which these pulses are produced. ([2] but see also [12])  
Actual thought and cognition occurs when neurons are activated. We don’t really need to 
know much about neurons and the complexity of their functioning, but there are a few basic 
“foothold” ideas that constrain the kinds of models we can build and that give us a sense of 
mechanism about cognitive processes. [2] 
Principle 3: Neuronal foothold principles:  
3.1. Neurons connect to each other. 
3.2. Neurons send information to each other via pulse trains when they are activated. 
                                                          
*  There are many examples of cognitive phenomena that could possibly be seen as “emergent” 
phenomena – behaviors that are not visible when viewed from the system’s component parts. 
Consciousness is the most obvious. However, see Dennett [10] and Damasio [9]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE MODELS  7 
 
 
3.3. Neurons may be in various stages of activation. 
3.4. Multiple neurons can link to a single neuron. 
3.5. Signals from one or more neurons can result in the activation of linked neurons. 
3.6. Neural connections can enhance or inhibit other neural connections. 
3.7. Information flows both from a set of neurons (e.g., sensory neurons) to processing 
neurons (feed-forward) and back (feedback). 
3.8. Learning appears to be associated with the growth of connections (synapses) 
between neurons. 
 
    
Fig. 2. Top left: potential difference between the surrounding fluid and a point near the cell in 
the brain of a fly. Bottom left: same signal filtered to remove low frequencies. Right: 
Voltage pattern of 5 action potentials overlaid. (From [12] p. 5, courtesy W. Bialek.)    
The fact that activation of one (or more) neurons can lead to activation of other neurons 
has profound implications. This leads to the idea of association, one of our fundamental tools 
for making sense of the cognitive response. The ideas that activation can be either inhibiting 
or enhancing and that the neural system contains considerable feedback underlies the concept 
of control, my second fundamental categorization of cognitive processing.  
Neuroscience has much interesting to say about neural development. One important point 
for understanding infants and very young children is that the brain is first built with far more 
neurons than appear to be needed. As a result of experience, new connections are made, but 
many cells die off. [13] [14] One implication is that early experience is extremely important. 
A kitten whose vision in one eye is blocked for the critical few early weeks never learns to 
see out of that eye, even though the eye may be fully functional.* A developmental point that 
may be relevant for young adults is myelination. Long axons develop a sheath that speeds up 
                                                          
*  This result is species specific, and does not hold, for example, for ferrets.  
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the transmission of signals along the axon dramatically. Some of the axons in the brain do not 
myelinate until well after puberty, suggesting that it is reasonable to infer that some cognitive 
functions could be late in developing.* [15] Interesting as this is, an extensive discussion of 
neuroscience and development is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we turn to consider 
how understanding some of what has been learned in neuroscience helps us understand 
cognition. 
2.2 Fine-grained constructivism and resources 
The fundamental results of neuroscience have inspired some approaches to applied 
cognition. Some researchers, both cognitive scientists [16] [17] and educational researchers 
[18], build very specific and detailed models of specific cognitive tasks. Another group 
creates computer programs to try to explicate specific steps and tasks necessary to complete a 
particular cognitive activity. [19] I will refer to these approaches collectively as 
connectionism.† Although connectionist approaches are interesting and may someday tell us 
something useful about cognition, at their present stage of development they seem rather far 
from what we need to understand what is happening in our classrooms.  
These approaches are trying to build microscopic theory of cognition, but what we need 
for studying education is to identify intermediate scale categories, collective variables, and 
principles that can guide our understanding of what we see and do in real educational 
environments – a mesoscopic theory. These structures should be at a fine enough grain size 
that they allow us to understand the structure of everyday thinking, but not so fine as to 
require a highly complex analysis for every statement anyone makes. We need to look for 
fundamental tools with general implications that arise from our assumption of principle 2 and 
the assumed characteristics of neural behavior. In some sense, the neuronal model provides us 
metaphors for the structure of thought that help us develop a way of thinking about thought.‡ 
Even our simple neural footholds listed under principle 3 lead us to a number of useful 
fundamental ideas. The first is what I like to call “neural solipsism imbedded in an external 
reality.”  
Principle 4: There is a real world out there and every individual creates his or her own 
internal interpretation of that world based on sensory input. 
Another way of saying this is: We each live in our own virtual reality, but we try to make that 
virtual reality as good an approximation to the true reality as possible. Culture in general and 
science in particular is a process we create to try to help each of us, alone in our own mental 
                                                          
*  Note, however, that Fuster comments ([2] p. 64) that “nowhere in the nervous system is myelination a 
precondition for axonal involvement as some level of function.” It might, however, affect the extent 
to which compilation (see section 3.1.1) can take place. 
†  For a clear summary and description of the strengths and weaknesses of connectionism, see [20], 
chapter 6. 
‡  Another useful metaphor for thought that meshes well with the neural is that of coupled non-linear 
oscillators. See Euler’s talk in this volume, in particular, the discussion of entrainment. [21] 
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space, to use our interactions with others in a community to improve our maps of what’s out 
there. 
Our over-arching interest as education researchers is in understanding what reality 
individuals have created and how they modify that view of reality as they acquire new 
knowledge. A fundamental hypothesis is: 
Principle 5:  New knowledge is built on a base of existing knowledge by building new links  
and suppressing old ones.  
Note that this principle only makes sense if we restrict our consideration to adults and older 
children. It is obvious to any parent who has watched an infant learn to cope with the world 
that at least some knowledge, if not “hard-wired” at birth, is “set up” to wire automatically 
given appropriate early environmental experiences.*  
Many educational researchers will recognize this as the neurological translation of the 
fundamental principle of constructivism – that individuals build their new knowledge on a 
base of their existing knowledge. What we are particularly interested in is fine-grained 
constructivism. We want to analyzing knowledge into more fundamental components in order 
to understand how that construction takes place. Even such basic neural processes as 
perception are not just simple connections. Inputs are highly transformed and processed. [21] 
Analogously, new knowledge can be created from old by extension, elaboration, and 
transformation. Creation of new knowledge depends on activation of resources that are 
already there – not just for recall but for processing, transforming, and recombining. 
I will refer to this overall structure as the resources approach. [23] In this approach, we 
want to answer the question: When a student responds to an instructional environment to 
build new knowledge, what existing resources are activated and how are they used?  Our goal 
is to develop a sufficient understanding of the cognitive structure of knowledge building to be 
able to predict what environments are likely to be more effective for more students. Our 
theoretical framework says resources should exist. A more detailed cognitive theory is 
required to specify what those resources are. Let’s next consider what has been learned from 
cognitive science that can help us. 
3 –  Cognitive mechanisms: Association and control 
The information we have from the neural level is too detailed and too limited to provide, 
by itself, much direct help in our classroom environments. We need to supplement what we 
learn at the neural level by observations of individual’s behavior in controlled and natural 
environments.†  
                                                          
*  Piaget calls this latter situation epigenetic. Fuster refers to pre-programmed structural knowledge as 
phyletic memory. [2] See the collected works of Piaget or [22]. 
†  In addition to the study of normal individuals, a significant point of contact between neuroscience and 
cognitive science is the study of lesions. In this area of research, the cognitive behavior of individuals 
with damage to specific parts of their brains is studied. This gives valuable ontological information: 
how cognitive behavior is parsed in the brain. [24] [25] 
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When we observe the actual behavior of individuals, we expect that observed behavior 
involves the activation of large numbers of neurons. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that even 
groups of neurons will show the structures that are demonstrated at the level of individual 
neurons. Three fundamental concepts we inherit from neuroscience are  
• activation,  
• association,  
• enhancement/inhibition.  
At the cognitive level, analogous structures recognized by cognitive researchers include 
• recall and priming, 
• linking, compilation, and spreading activation, 
• control and executive function. 
I discuss each briefly from the point of view of cognitive studies before turning to a detailed 
discussion of some theories for helping us understand learning and instruction. 
3.1 The structure of memory: putting stuff in (learning) and getting it out (recall) 
To understand learning, we must understand memory – how information is stored in the 
brain. Modern cognitive science now has complex and detailed structural information about 
how memory works. [2] [6] [26] 
Over the years, there have been many attempts to find structures in human memory. Two 
groups of observations have been critical in building what we know: the observation of 
amnesiacs and controlled experiments with normal individuals. Amnesia often results from 
brain injury. In many cases, the individual loses some memory capabilities while retaining 
others.*  In controlled experiments, psychologists have been able to map in great detail the 
timing and character of certain (simple) parts of the memory system. The basic structure of 
memory that many psychologists and neuroscientists currently accept is illustrated in figure 3. 
We don’t really need all of the structures in this complex diagram, but I include it to give you 
an idea of what mental structures are reasonably well established by cognitive- and neuro-
scientists. If you are interested in more information about the elements of this diagram, 
consult [2] and [26]. 
Input from the external world comes in through the senses and is processed in a fast 
sensory pre-processing system. The output of this system is then combined in a short-term or 
working memory in which the processed sensory information is mixed with information from 
a long-term store. An executive controls what is done with the mixed data through the 
mechanisms of paying attention and conscious thought.  
                                                          
*  In a famous case (H.M., see [27]), a patient, part of whose brain had been surgically removed, lost the 
ability to create long-term episodic memories. He could conduct conversations but not remember 
them even a few minutes later but he was able to remember events before his surgery and learn new 
motor skills (but not remember learning them). 
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Transfer of results created in working memory into long-term memory is not immediate 
but requires repetition and significant time, often days or weeks.*  In our neural model, this is 
plausible since we expect that formation of memories may actually require growth of new 
synapses. 
 
External 
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Fig. 3: A map of the structure of human memory. Adapted from [2] and [26]. 
Long-term memory can be divided into two parts, declarative memory and implicit 
memory. Declarative memory contains knowledge that can be articulated, such as facts and 
consciously followed procedures (semantic memory), and memories of events and situations 
(episodic memory). Implicit memory concerns procedural and motor memories that are not 
articulated – like knowing how to run or ride a bicycle – as well as habits and conditioned 
responses.  
It is clear from all the different things that people can do that require memory that 
memory is a highly complex and structured phenomenon. Fortunately, we only need to 
understand a small part of the structure to get started in learning more about how to teach 
effectively. Six foothold ideas from cognitive science are:  
Principle 6: Cognitive foothold principles:  
6.1. Memory has two functionally distinct components: working (or short term) memory 
and long-term memory. 
                                                          
*  Highly emotional events are processed through different systems and can occur much more quickly 
than day-to-day learning. 
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6.2. Working memory can only handle a small number of data blocks. It is labile, often 
lasting only a few seconds without specific activities to prolong it. 
6.3. Long-term memory contains a vast quantity of facts, data, and rules for how to use 
and process them (declarative and implicit memory). It is highly stable and can 
store data for decades. 
6.4. Getting information from working to long-term memory requires repetition. 
6.5. Getting information from long-term memory to working memory may be difficult 
and time consuming. 
The details of this structure are still somewhat controversial. For example, it is clear that 
working memory has distinct verbal and visual parts. Subjects can carry out simple verbal and 
visual tasks simultaneously without interference, but two verbal or two visual tasks interfere 
with each other.* [5] [6] The independence of these two memory modules can be illustrated 
by simple experiments in which subjects try to remember lists of words while doing other 
tasks. These structures will have implications for us when we discuss the use of various 
representations in displaying physical information.† Recent evidence suggests there may be 
other independent components to working memory. [29] 
The point 6.5 in our cognitive foothold list turns out to have great importance for us. If we 
“know something,” that is, if it is present in our long term memory, we might not be able to 
access it immediately. We have all had the experience of meeting someone we know well out 
of the normal context in which we know them and being unable to recall their name. What is 
needed to activate the memory is a chain of associations. This is discussed in section 3.2. 
3.1.1 Chunking 
Working memory is basically the part of the brain activated when we are thinking about 
something. Working memory is fast but can only handle a fairly small number of “units” or 
“chunks” at one time. Early experiments by Miller [30] suggested that the number was “7±2”. 
More recent experiments indicate that this is an oversimplification. Semantic memory, for 
example, typically seems to be able to hold only “3±1” items.  
We cannot understand these numbers until we ask “What do they mean by a chunk?”  
Miller’s experiments involved strings of numbers, letters, or words. But clearly people can 
construct very large arguments!  If I had to write out everything that is contained in the proof 
of a theorem in quantum field theory it would take hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pages. 
The key, of course, is that I don’t write out or explicate everything when I am thinking about 
a piece of the proof. My knowledge is combined into hierarchies of blocks (or chunks) that I 
can work with even with my limited short-term processing ability. 
                                                          
*  In the cognitive and neuroscience literatures these are referred to as the auditory or phonological loop 
and the visuo-spatial sketchpad. 
†  As a simple example of interference, try taking your pulse while whistling a song. This is difficult, 
but we seem to have no trouble keeping track of a song’s words and music at the same time. 
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To see how this works, try multiplying a pair of two-digit numbers in your head. Stop and 
try it before going on. Did you keep all of the parts in mind at once?  Or did you create 
subtotals, forgetting about the numbers that went into building them? Most of us who work 
frequently with numbers can multiply two-digit numbers without “putting stuff away in 
storage.”  Now try doing it with a pair of three-digit numbers. The difference between having 
fewer than “7±2” objects to work with and significantly more becomes painfully clear. 
Another example in which you can see the structure of working memory in your own head 
is to try to memorize the following string of numbers: 
3 5 2 9 7 4 3 1 0 4 8 5 
Look at it, read it aloud to yourself or have someone read it aloud to you, look away for ten 
seconds and try to write the string down without looking at it. How did you do?  Most people 
given this task will get some right at the beginning, some right at the end, and do very badly 
in the middle. Now try the same task with the following string 
1 7 7 6 1 8 6 5 1 9 4 1 
If you are an American and if you noticed the pattern (try grouping the numbers in blocks of 
four) you are likely to have no trouble getting them all correct – even a week later. 
The groups of four numbers in the second string are “chunks” – each string of four 
numbers is associated with a year, not seen as four independent numbers. The interesting 
thing to note here is that some people look at the second string of numbers and do not 
automatically notice that it conveniently groups into years. These people have just as much 
trouble with the second string as with the first – until the chunking is pointed out to them. 
This illustrates a number of interesting issues about working memory. 
Principle 7: Working memory foothold ideas 
7.1 Working memory has a limited size, but it can work with chunks that can have 
considerable structure. 
7.2 Working memory does not function independently of long-term memory. The 
interpretation and understanding of items in working memory depend on their 
presence and on associations in long-term memory. 
7.3 The effective number of chunks a piece of information takes up in working 
memory depends on the individual’s knowledge and mental state (i.e., whether 
the knowledge has been activated). 
This example also points out something of general importance. The study of the 
memorizability of number strings is an example of what I referred to above as a zero-friction 
experiment. It does not much resemble a real world activity but it tells something about 
fundamental brain mechanism. However, the zero-friction result can be trumped by friction 
when imbedded in a realistic situation. Since the three years in the second string-of-numbers 
example are tied to strongly held and easily recalled semantic knowledge, they are easily 
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reconstructed at a later time. This is why coherence is so important in learning structured 
bodies of knowledge such as science.* 
Item 7.2 in our list is fairly obvious when we think about reading. We see text in terms of 
words, not in terms of letters, and the meanings of those words must be in long-term storage. 
Item 7.3 is something we will encounter again and again in different contexts: How students 
respond to a piece of information presented to them depends both on what they know already 
and on their mental state – what information they are cued to access. 
3.1.2 Compiled Knowledge: Creating Chunks 
The number of chunks a piece of information has for an individual depends not only on 
whether or not they have relevant associations but how strong and easily that knowledge is 
activated in long-term memory. When a group of knowledge elements – facts and processes – 
is easily available and can easily be used as a single unit in working memory, we say the 
knowledge is compiled. Computer programming is a reasonably good metaphor for this. 
When code in a high-level computer language has to be translated line-by-line into machine 
instructions, the code runs slowly. If the code is compiled directly so that only machine-
language instructions are presented, the code runs much more quickly. 
Some of the difficulties students encounter – and that we encounter in understanding their 
difficulties – arise from the issue of compilation. Physics instructors work with many large 
blocks of compiled knowledge. Because of this, many arguments that seem simple to them go 
beyond the bounds of working memory for their students. If the students have not compiled 
the knowledge, an argument that the instructor can do in a few operations in working memory 
may require the student to carry out a long series of manipulations, putting some intermediate 
information out to temporary storage in order to carry out other parts of the reasoning.  
3.1.3 Buffers: Holding Information in Working Memory 
Studies with animals and with brain damaged amnesia victims make clear that working 
memory and long-term memory are carried by different structures in the brain.†  Studies with 
subjects trying to recall strings of information indicate that items fade from working memory 
in a few seconds if the subject does not try to remember the information by repeating it 
consciously. [6] This working memory repetition is known as rehearsal. Think about looking 
up a telephone number in a phonebook. Most of us can’t remember it – even for the few 
seconds needed to tap in the number – without actively repeating it. 
The short lifetime of working memory has serious implications for the way we 
communicate with other people, both in speaking and writing. In computer science, holding 
information aside in preparation for using it later is called buffering, and the storage space in 
                                                          
*  Note this also gives us some predictability. Asked the string of years a week late, it is unlikely that an 
American would make the error “1756” for “1776” but might recall it as “1789” instead – substituting 
another data associated with the creation of the USA rather than making a random substitution.  
†  From the response of patients and animals with damage to their brains, it seems clear that the 
structure that performs the translation from working to long-term memory lies in the medial temporal 
lobe, perhaps in the hippocampus or related structures.[30][24]  
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which the information is placed is called a buffer. Since human working memory is a buffer 
that is volatile and only has a lifetime of a few seconds, it can be very confusing to present 
people with information that relies on information that has not yet been provided. The given 
information may be forgotten by the time it is needed. Doing this can mess up a student’s 
ability to make sense out of a lecture or a surfer’s ability to understand a webpage.* 
Learning something complex like how to solve physics problems involves more than just 
the automatic process of remembering a conversation held earlier in the afternoon or 
remembering experiences from a trip to Paris. What is critical in long-term memory for 
physics is not just having the memory, but being able to use it and make the associations that 
bring it into working memory. This is of particular importance for us in understanding our 
students, since we want their knowledge of physics to be functional: We want them to know 
when and how to use it as well as to recognize it. To understand these more complex issues 
we have to leave the simple cognitive- and neuro-science experiments and turn to the 
educational phenomenologists, though we still want to retain plausibility with respect to what 
is currently known about neuroscience and basic cognitive processes. 
What is clear from many educational studies is that learning of complex abstract 
information is neither simple nor automatic. It requires substantial repetition and practice to 
compile knowledge and it requires carefully designed educational environments to lead to 
appropriate patterns of associations in long-term memory. In order to understand how this 
works, we need to know something about how information is structured in long-term 
memory. 
3.2 Links, structures, and context dependence  
The basic structure in memory activation is association. This principle is well established 
both from a neural base [2] and from cognitive studies. [6] Activating one knowledge element 
or resource may lead to the activation of other related resource elements. If you are asked to 
list the names or four animals and then to list four objects beginning with the letter “b,” you 
are very likely to include a number of animals (such as “bear” or “beaver”) in your list. Since 
neurons can exist in multiple levels of activation, we are not surprised to find that activating 
one item from long-term memory can make it easier to activate other items, even if they are 
not consciously activated. This is known as priming. It represents a first simple level or 
associational activation.†   
Other associations flow quite naturally when a particular bit of knowledge is activated. 
Collins and Loftus describe this process with the term spreading activation. [34] Since the 
activation of some neurons can enhance or inhibit the activation of other neurons or 
strengthen or weaken other neuronal connections, we should not be surprised to find complex 
activation patterns and subtle responses.  
                                                          
*  In the theory of communications, this leads to the “given-new principle” in conversation and writing. 
[31] [32]  
†  Priming can occur even when the stimuli doing the priming are presented very quickly and not 
consciously noted. [5] 
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Activation of one resource therefore tends to lead to the activation of a cluster of related 
resources. In the cognitive literature there is a large body of work on these issues and a wide 
variety of terms are used, often inconsistently from one research team to another. I will 
therefore introduce a small number of terms and define them carefully. 
I refer to any set of related resources that are activated together in a particular situation as 
a pattern of association. Two terms are commonly used in the cognitive literature to describe 
particular patterns of association: schema and (mental) model. Both describe patterns of 
association that are robust and are activated reliably in a variety of circumstances. I follow the 
notation of D’Andrade and call such a pattern a schema* if it is a “bounded, distinct, unitary 
representation” that is not too large to hold in working memory. I call a pattern a (mental) 
model if it consists of “an interrelated set of elements which fit together to represent 
something. Typically one uses a model to reason with or calculate from by mentally 
manipulating the parts of the model in order to solve some problem.” [20, p. 151]† “Model” is 
the more inclusive term: a schema is a simple model. 
In order to try to create a baseline from which we can build, I define the idea of context in 
the crudest possible fashion consistent with our principle 3. In the mind of a particular 
individual, context is the state of activation of each of the neurons in the individual’s brain at 
a particular instant. We then have the context dependence principle: 
Principle 8: The activation of a particular resource in response to a presented stimulus can 
depend not only on the stimulus but on the context – the activation pattern existing in the 
brain when the stimulus is presented. 
 
Fig. 4: A schematic representation of the association of resources into schemas. The different 
colored rings in the schema on the left indicates a context dependence. The darker circles 
associate as indicated under one context, the lighter circles under a different one. 
                                                          
*  This term has a long history in the cognitive literature, going back to Kant [35] and Bartlett [36].  
†  Note that Johnson-Laird uses the term “mental model” in a narrower, more technical sense. [37] 
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This principle is only a baseline and appears trivially obvious, especially since it contains 
the weasel words “can depend on.” This doesn’t say it does or it doesn’t. This is part of what I 
mean by a “theoretical framework” as opposed to a theory. The principle tells us to pay 
attention to context dependence, but doesn’t tell us how or when. That’s the job of the various 
theories that need to be constructed. An illustration of a pattern of association relating two 
context dependent mental models is given in figure 4. 
What the framework does it to tell us to ask of any theory: “What are you assuming about 
context dependence?”  And of course one must add, “and how do you show us that your 
assumptions are correct?” Theories of mind need to tell us what matters in the vast activation 
pattern and what doesn’t for a particular activity in a particular situation. Although this is a 
weak principle, the focus on the individual and on mechanism does help us to keep in mind 
some obvious facts that are frequently ignored, such as: 
Principle 9: An item presented to a student is not part of the student’s context until the 
student takes notice of it (though this “notice” may be through unconscious priming). 
In other words, it does not suffice to consider the instructional environment and the material 
presented to the student to be the “context.”  It is the student’s response to the environment 
and what is presented that has to be considered to be the context for cognitive activity. 
Since it is impossible to determine the complete activation context in an individual’s 
brain, it is likely that we will often have to take a less deterministic view and to treat the 
activation of resources probabilistically. 
The important thing to keep in mind is that the productive character of memory activation 
and the context dependence of the particular response lead to a system that has a general 
stability but a specific fluidity. The cognitive system – even for a single individual – is very 
labile (dynamic). It needs to be flexible when dealing with the immense complexity of the 
world. But we can also note (and we often tend to forget) that a lot of an individual’s behavior 
is actually highly predictable. We just tend to take that part of behavior for granted. (For 
example: If you take your 8 year old child into a MacDonald’s for the twentieth time, you are 
very likely to know exactly what she will want to order, how much of it she will eat, whether 
she will agitate to buy the “toy-of-the-week” and so on.) 
Donald Norman described this well in the mid 1980s. 
Because the schema is in reality the theorist’s interpretation of the system 
configuration, and because the system configures itself differently according to the 
sum of all the numerous influences upon it, each new invocation of a schema may 
differ from the previous invocations. Thus, the system behaves as if there were 
prototypical schemas, but where the prototype is constructed anew for each occasion 
by combining past experiences with biases and activation levels resulting from the 
current experience and the context in which it occurs. [38, p. 535] 
I summarize this in the productivity principle. 
Principle 10: Resources and their organizational structures, schemas and models, are 
productively recreated at need out of activations of smaller elements of long-term memory.  
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3.3 Control and Executive function 
The next component we want to identify from the cognitive/neuroscience literature is 
executive function. The associational patterns described above bring information from long-
term memory into working memory in response to sensory data. But associations are often 
superficial and inappropriate. In addition, associations called up by sensory input can be 
contradictory. The world contains such a large number of possible objects, interrelationships, 
and options that our brain, large and complex as it is, could be easily overwhelmed by the 
number of choices we have to make, both of how we see and organize our view of the world 
and how we decide what to do in it. 
3.3.1 The Mental Executive and Selective Attention 
Baddely conjectured that the brain has a mental executive that manages working memory. 
[6] The idea of executive function is very broadly supported by cognitive zero friction 
studies, lesion studies, and fMRI scans and appears to reside largely in the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC). [39][40] Executive function is in some sense a modern analysis of the concept of 
selective attention, which has been a topic of study in psychology since its earliest days. [41]  
An example where you can feel this acting in your own head is the Stroop task. [42] If 
you are shown a series of colored blocks, it is easy to read off the colors. Your color receptors 
activate a response that is linked to an association with a word. If you are given a list of color 
words printed in black, it is easy to read off the colors. Your visual response activates 
semantic meaning associated with colors. If you are given the pattern shown in the top of 
figure 5 and are asked to read the color inks that the words are printed in you will find it easy 
since the word names and the ink colors are consistent. But if you try it in the lower figure, 
where they are inconsistent, you will find it extremely difficult. 
In the latter case, your sensory input activates two contradictory color associations – one 
through your color perceptions, one through your word associations. The executive activity of 
selecting the activated response appropriate for the task is a function of the prefrontal cortex. 
Studies using fMRI show increased activity in the PFC during the Stroop task and patients 
with damage to this part of the brain have severe difficulty with the task. [43] Lesion studies 
also demonstrate that controlled social responses are also associated with the PFC. Patients 
with PFC damage often show reduced inhibitions and inappropriate social behavior. 
3.3.2 Controlling Activation of Associations 
As in the study of associational patterns, there are a variety of attempts to build 
fundamental neuro-cognitive theories of executive function. [44][45] Again, we are not at this 
time interested in building a detailed theory from first principles, but rather in establishing a 
theoretical framework with some mesoscopic elements relevant for education. All executive 
functions have a structural feature in common. They enhance (turn on) or suppress (turn off) 
associational patterns.  
As a result, we abstract from the studies of attention and executive function a fundamental 
structure: that of control. We can think of the analogies of two kinds of switches: a flashlight 
and a train on a track. In a flashlight, the battery and the bulb are associated by a link. The 
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switch activates and deactivates that link. In a train on a track, the train may have an option of 
traveling in one of two directions: the switch chooses which way it will go. Of course, these 
are only analogies. Neurons can be in a variety of activation states and resources are active. 
As in our study of associational structures, this means that elements of executive control are 
potentially as productive and labile as schemas. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: The Stroop task illustrating executive function. Read the colors that the words are 
printed in. In the top figure word and ink color are consistent. In the bottom they are not. 
Separating control from association allows us to describe knowledge structures and their 
context dependence separately and has powerful implications both for our understanding of 
our students’ responses and for our understanding of what produces those responses. 
The two basic structures in our cognitive model are illustrated schematically in figure 6. 
Association of resources provides the structure of knowledge appropriate to a given situation, 
while the control structure is associated with attention, context dependence, and goal-oriented 
decisions. This coarse separation provides the fundamental basis of our theoretical 
framework. Note that we are not here referring to neural structures. Both associational and 
control structures occur at all levels of brain functioning, down to the level of individual 
neurons. The separation into association and control is a 0th order approximation for 
organizing our mesoscopic analysis of cognition. 
These elements provide a basic structure for organizing what we know. In order to 
provide useful structures for understanding teaching and learning, each sector of our 
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theoretical framework now needs to be fleshed out by specific models. In the next two 
sections we discuss some plausible starting points.  
 
 
Fig. 6: The two basic structures of our cognitive model: association (left) and control (right). 
4 Knowledge and Knowledge Structure 
At its core, my theoretical framework describes student knowledge as comprised of 
cognitive resources in various forms and levels of hierarchy. Within each level is a collection 
of resources that are primed, activated, and deactivated depending on context and executive 
control. 
Principle 11: Reasoning about any particular question entails a selection, tacit or explicit, 
from a collection of resources. 
More details require a model of what the resources are and how they are associated. 
Various proposals have been made that assume that the relevant structures are tightly 
associated, loosely associated, compiled, etc. [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] In this section, I 
describe some elements of a resources model of knowledge structure that is appropriate for 
looking at students’ knowledge of physics. 
4.1 Identifying relevant resources: Reasoning and phenomenological primitives 
In order to set up a model within our theoretical framework, we need to specify the 
resources that are available for the tasks of interest and how they are associated in relevant 
contexts. One model that has been proposed identifies a particular set of schemas as a set of 
resources relevant for physics learning: the phenomenological primitives (p-prim for short) 
described by diSessa. [48] These are basic statements about the functioning of the physical 
world that a student considers obvious and irreducible.  
Asked to explain why it is hotter in the summer than in the winter, many students will 
respond that it is because the earth is closer to the sun. Educators often attribute this response 
to a faulty conception students have formed, by which the earth moves in a highly eccentric 
ellipse around the sun, and for some students this may be the case. DiSessa's account allows 
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an alternative interpretation: Asked the question, students conduct a quick search among the 
resources they have in their knowledge that may apply, and one of the first they tend to find is 
the notion that closer is stronger. Students' tendency to explain seasons in terms of proximity 
to the sun may be understood as a faulty activation of this resource, which in itself is neither 
correct nor incorrect. (It is hotter closer to a fire.)  Other resources students have available 
would be more productive, such as for understanding greater strength arising from more 
direct incidence. DiSessa has described some of these primitives, and there are certainly many 
more.  
These structures are “primitive” in the sense that they are indivisible to the user: Ask a 
student why it feels hotter closer to the fire, and from the student's perspective there is 
nothing else to say.* That’s just the way things are. From this perspective, there are thousands 
of primitives – ones for interaction with the large variety of physical experiences we have in 
this complex world. DiSessa explicitly [48] chooses not to separate abstract and concrete 
primitives, but to focus on irreducibility as viewed by the user. 
 
Fig. 7: Abstract reasoning primitives are mapped 
 into facets for specific physical situations.. 
Having a large number of primitive elements is somewhat daunting in what is meant to be 
a theory of mechanism. I therefore find it convenient to abstract reasoning primitives from 
diSessa’a p-prims. These are general rules and relationships that become concrete statements 
about a particular physical system as a result of a mapping – an association of the elements in 
the reasoning primitive with an item or quantity in the physical world. (See figure 7.) 
Following Minstrell, if I am focusing on the result of the mapping I refer to the mapped 
                                                          
*  A physicist who has well-developed ideas about the mechanism of heat generation 
and transmission m Although it is difficult to obtain direct evidence for a reasoning primitive 
and a mapping when the structure is invisible to the user, it is nonetheless useful as a 
classification scheme. In addition, it has the satisfying character that there are a fairly small 
number of reasoning primitives. It is the mapping onto the complexity of the world that 
produces the huge number of facets.  
ay be able to construct reasons for the result. It is no longer a primitive result for her. 
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primitive as a facet. [50] Thus, in the summer/winter example the reasoning primitive is 
closer to a source is more effective. The result when it is warmer on the earth we are closer to 
the sun is a facet. When I want to emphasize the irreducibility to the user, I continue to refer 
to the principle as a p-prim. 
Students are rarely aware of the structure of a mapping. An unusual but felicitous 
counterexample to this rule is provided in the transcript of an interview done by Loverude 
probing student understanding of the principles of fluid mechanics. [51] Loverude posed the 
problem on the flow of water from one tank to another shown in figure 8. The student’s 
response dramatically illustrates the idea of reasoning primitives and mapping. 
 
 
Two containers with water are connected by a rubber tube  
with a pinch clamp as shown schematically in the figure  
at the right. When the clamp is opened what will happen  
to the water levels? 
    
Fig. 8: A problem is fluid mechanics posed by Loverude. [51] 
It will continue to move until there’s some sort of homeostasis, or whatever you call it, an 
equilibrium, which may be, it’s either going to be that the volumes are the same, or the 
heights will be the same, I’m trying to think of which one it’s going to be. Do you want me to 
tell you which?  (laughs) Um, I’ll go with volume for now but I’m not sure. So it’d be lower in 
the larger container…. 
It’s really not reasoning, it’s more just thinking about, these things want to be equal, and 
what are the ways things could be equal? One was fluid volume, and one was height. 
This student explicitly is activating balancing and is explicitly (and unusually) aware of 
the need to map the abstract primitive onto the quantities in the problem. Although this is not 
common, it is a nice confirmation of what we believe is happening in general at a less 
conscious level. 
4.2 Associational Patterns: Theories of student knowledge structures 
Once we’ve identified relevant resources, the next natural question in our theoretical 
framework is: to what extent and under what circumstances (contexts) are resources 
associated with each other. Does activation of one resource imply the activation of others in 
most cases? If the patterns are tightly organized, so that activation of one element almost 
always activates the others, we may treat the pattern as a schema. (Recall that we use the term 
schema as a general term to refer to a robust pattern of association of knowledge structures.)  
If the pattern is sufficiently tightly organized (compiled), it can serve as a single unit in 
working memory. An issue of great interest in physics education research is the extent to 
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which student knowledge resources are tightly and robustly organized and how strongly they 
are activated by a range of situations.  
In the early 1980s, education researchers proposed that students’ knowledge of physics 
(especially in mechanics, where everyone has everyday experience with forces and motion) 
were organized into naïve theories that were robust and coherent. These theories often were 
assumed to resemble the theories constructed by natural philosophers throughout history. 
McCloskey and Vosniadou are two proponents of this viewpoint. [52][53] This theory is often 
referred to as the misconception, naïve conception, or alternative conception theory.  
An alternative hypothesis is that student knowledge and reasoning consists of weakly 
organized resources. In this case, student reasoning might appear fragmented and 
inconsistent. McDermott and diSessa are two leading researchers who have argued strongly 
that empirical evidence supports this theory. [48][54]  
Within our theoretical framework, it is clear that the characterization of a well organized 
knowledge structure as a “misconception” (or even a naïve or alternative conception) focuses 
on an issue that is not part of the cognitive model – whether or not the knowledge structure 
agrees with the one we are trying to teach. It is more appropriate to characterize the 
knowledge along the axes of robustness (how broadly the knowledge is activated in a variety 
of situations), degree of compilation (the extent to which complex knowledge can be applied 
as a unit in working memory), and level of integration (how much diverse knowledge is tied 
together). Rather than characterizing the two theories described above as “misconceptions” 
and “fragmented,” we will describe them as the model theory and the modular theory. The 
idea is that in the first theory, student resources are assumed to be well organized into a stable 
cognitive model of how a system works, while in the second, knowledge is more fragmented 
and labile. Some characteristics of these two theories are outlined in the table below.  
 
MODEL THEORY  
OF STUDENT KNOWLEDGE 
MODULAR THEORY  
OF STUDENT KNOWLEDGE 
Strongly associated resources include many 
elements 
Activated resources are largely independent 
and only weakly associated 
Activated in a wide variety of contexts Activated in limited contexts 
Stable and resistant to change Labile and easily changed 
Table 1: Two contrasting theories of student knowledge structures. Adapted from [55]. 
Notice that these two theories are not the only possibilities. For example, there could be a 
single resource that is activated in a wide variety of contexts and is stable and resistant to 
change. I propose that the term misconception be reserved to mean a knowledge structure that 
is activated in a wide variety of contexts, is stable and resistant to change, and is in 
disagreement with accepted scientific knowledge. 
Notice also that the model theory of student knowledge is much closer to the kind of 
knowledge we want them to develop than the modular theory is. If students start with an 
expectation that they will develop a coherent understanding we can instruct them in a very 
different way than if that is not a part of their way of thinking about the world. I say more 
about this in section 5. 
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An example of what I mean by “labile” is seen in a transcript of a laboratory activity 
observed by my research group. The lab takes place in the second semester of college 
physics. The two lab partners are upper division biology majors carrying out a traditional 
laboratory on the interference of light. The TA has asked them to explain the behavior of the 
pattern produced on a screen by the interference of light from a laser as it passes through two 
narrow slits as the separation between the slits is changed.* 
 
Veronica: It [the pattern] gets more, well, obviously when it gets more narrow, the slits 
get narrower. As it gets wider, the slits get wider. Wow. [sarcasm]  
Claude: The width of the slit increases with increasing?  So, what’s that?  
Veronica: This is .2, the other one was .4  Or .02  
Claude: That’s .02?  
Veronica: Yeah.  
Claude: Then [the pattern we got with] 8 was narrower. Yeah. We started out with .08 
and it was like… 
Veronica: Oh, the wider the width the narrower the slits get. Because there’s more room 
for light interference because there’s more rays of light going through. 
 
Veronica’s first response appears to be a facet mapped from the reasoning primitive “more 
cause produces more effect.” Notice how quickly and easily Veronica switches from being 
very confident that the dependence works in one direction to being very comfortable and 
confident that it works in the opposite way. She is able to easily re-map her reasoning 
primitive to obtain the opposite result. 
More complex situations can also be observed. A very nice example comes from the work 
of Scherr and collaborators. [56][57] In this work, the researchers probed the knowledge of 
upper division physics majors and graduate students who were studying special relativity on 
the topic of simultaneity. They found that most of the students believed 
1. Events are simultaneous if an observer receives signals from the events at the 
same instant. 
2. Simultaneity is absolute. If one observer sees two events as simultaneous all 
observers will see events as simultaneous. 
3. Every observer constitutes a distinct local reference frame. 
In interviews, they asked students to consider the problem shown in figure 9. 
In discussing this problem, students clearly demonstrated resources 1 and 3. They treated 
the individual as a local reference frame, failing to remove the effect of signal travel time and 
failing to consider the global reference frame of rods and clocks that had been taught in 
lecture. However, when the question was reformulated to specifically mention light travel 
time and students probed to recall the technical meaning of the term “reference frame,” they 
had no trouble correcting themselves. 
                                                          
*  Throughout this paper, names cited in transcripts are gender correct pseudonyms. 
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Mt. Rainier and Mt. Hood erupt at the same time in the reference frame of a 
seismologist at rest in a laboratory midway between them. A spacecraft flying 
past Rainier towards Hood at v=0.8c is directly over Mt. Rainier when it erupts. 
Let Event 1 be “Mt. Rainier erupts,” and Event 2 be “Mt. Hood erupts.” 
In the spacecraft frame, does Event 1 occur before, after, or at the same time as 
Event 2? 
 
Fig. 9: Problem posed by Scherr et al. [56] 
The second student belief tells a different story. Scherr et al. posed the problem shown in 
figure 10 to their students working in a Tutorial environment.* This is the standard Einstein 
railroad car simultaneity problem with a twist. Students who believe item 2 don’t appear to be 
troubled by getting different results for the wavefronts. (Perhaps they don’t interpret 
wavefronts to be tangible objects.) But the tape recorder is a different story. Here is a typical 
transcript of an exchange where four students are considering this problem. 
 
Dennis: We just figured out that the tape player plays in Alan's frame. 
Tony: But it can't. In Beth's frame they hit her at the same time. So she won't hear it. 
Jana: But look down here, it's asking if she hears it and if the tape will have wound from 
its starting position. If the tape is going to play, that's it, it's going to play. 
Tony: But it can't play for Beth!  She's in the middle!  They hit her at the same time! 
Dennis: But we just figured out that it plays! 
Tony: Right!  And then a black hole opens up!  And God steps out! and he points his 
finger and says [shouting] “YOU CAN’T DO THAT!” 
 
On the issue of the absoluteness of simultaneity, student responses are highly stable and 
resistant to change. In interview situations, Scherr et al. found that students sometimes sit 
silent and unresponsive for thirty seconds or more when considering this problem. In groups, 
they observed students sometimes becoming loud and aggressive, or resorting to absurdities 
(as above) or to topics they know are confusing and that they may not understand very well 
(such as quantum mechanics). 
                                                          
*  The University of Washington Tutorial environment is a set of worksheet-guided small-group 
interactive-engagement lessons that often make use of cognitive conflict. For a description see [58] or 
[88]. A collection of these lessons are published in [64]. 
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A train is moving along a long straight track at a high velocity (near the speed of 
light). Alan stands on the ground by the train track; Beth stands on the train. 
Sparks jump at front and rear of train, simultaneously in Alan’s frame, leaving 
char marks. 
 -- Draw the light wavefronts produced by the sparks in Alan’s frame. 
 -- In Alan’s frame, do the wavefronts hit Beth at the same instant? 
 -- Does Beth see the wavefronts arrive at the same instant? 
A cassette player sits at Beth’s feet. If the front wavefront hits it first, it plays 
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony at top volume; if the wavefronts hit simultaneously, 
it does not play. 
 -- Does the player play in Alan’s frame? 
 -- In Beth’s frame? 
Later in the day, Beth ejects the tape from the player. She descends from the 
train, and she and Alan examine the tape together. 
 -- Will the tape have wound at all from its starting position? 
 
     
Fig. 10: Relativity problem posed by Scherr et al. [56] 
This example illustrates that even on a reasonably narrow instructional topic, we may 
encounter student schemas that are modular (weakly held, fragmented, labile) at almost the 
same time that we activate misconceptions (strongly held, robustly activated, stable, and 
wrong). Our model can accommodate both types of structure. The decision as to which is 
more appropriate is an empirical one – and could be different for different topics, individuals, 
or situations. 
4.3  Linkage patterns: Building coherence and integrating knowledge 
There have been a few attempts to describe the way students associate their primitive 
resources. Often, however, terms such as “concepts” are tossed around without definition 
assuming that “everyone knows what it means.” This can lead to confusion and substantial 
wasting of time arguing when two researchers use contradictory tacit definitions. 
In an attempt to begin to define appropriate associational structures for use in 
understanding physics learning, diSessa and Sherin have introduced the concept of 
coordination class. [49] In [59], diSessa defines a coordination class as “a specific collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE MODELS  27 
 
 
of knowledge and strategies that allow us to read out (‘see’) a distinctive class of information 
from the world.” DiSessa and Sherin structure a coordination class into two parts in order to 
permit the description of the context dependence of an idea. A readout strategy is a set of 
resources that translate sensory information into meaningful and processable terms. A causal 
net is the set of relevant inferences about the relevant information and their context-dependent 
associations. Figure 4 illustrates some elements of what might be the causal net for a 
coordination class. 
One example of a coordination class is ‘force.’ DiSessa discusses this in [59] and I refer 
you there for details. Wittmann applied the idea of coordination class to his description of 
student understanding of waves on a string. [60] At this summer school, Mestre reported on 
an application of the coordination class structure to students’ understanding of the ball-on-a-
track problem; I discuss this in detail in section 5.2.2 (see figure 15). [61] In discussions with 
attendees to this summer school in response to Mestre’s presentation, it was clear that the 
issue of whether the community wants to agree to define a coordination class as a stable or 
dynamic (labile) structure has not been decided at this time. My sense of diSessa and Sherin’s 
intent in introducing the term is that they were particularly concerned to be able to describe 
the context dependence of phenomena. In that case, it appears to me to be more productive to 
define a coordination class as a labile, dynamic structure that has associational links that 
could be weak or strong. As, for example, a student made the transition from a naïve user of 
the term ‘force’ to an expert user one would say that his coordination class evolved rather 
than that he moved from not having a coordination class to having one. For more details, see 
[59] and [61].  
The coordination class structure, especially if one accepts a dynamic definition, is 
particularly appropriate for discussing the transition from modular to model-based reasoning. 
Another kind of associational structure has been proposed by other researchers who assume 
that student reasoning with mental models is dominant. Samarpungavan and Wiers introduce 
the idea of an explanatory model.* [62] This consists of a network of prestored “beliefs” 
(possibly interpretable as facets in my framework) that constrain the particular associational 
patterns a student can activate. The authors assume that such a framework is internally 
consistent and robust. Although it takes a bit of translation to get this model into my 
theoretical framework, I would interpret their description as saying that the fundamental 
resources that make up explanatory models are stored directly without being generated on the 
spot by the mapping of a more abstract resource.  
An example of how associational patterns affect the performance of students in physics 
classes is given by Sabella. [63] The problem shown in figure 11 is most conveniently solved 
using the work-energy theorem. Sabella found in interviews that some graduate students 
doing this problem got ‘stuck’ in a pattern of associations to forces and could not activate 
their knowledge resources about energy. Parts a) and b) in the problem seem to play a strong 
role in activating force resources (and perhaps suppressing energy resources). Introductory 
                                                          
*  The authors use the term “explanatory framework.” Since I am trying to use the terms “framework,” 
“theory,” and “model” in a consistent way, I have translated this to my terminology. Their 
explanatory framework is a mental model in my terms. 
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students in calculus-based physics did significantly better on this problem (and used energy 
arguments much more frequently) when parts a) and b) were omitted. [63] 
 
A hand applies a force to a small 1 kg block from “A” to “C.” The block starts at 
rest at point “A” and then comes to rest at point “C.”  The block moves along a 
frictionless surface from “A” to “B” and then travels an equal distance along a 
surface with friction from “B” to “C” with the force of the hand remaining constant.  
The force of the hand is 2 N to the right and the distance from “A” to “C” is 2 m.   
 
                    
A B C
frictionno friction
1 m 1 m
PM
Final position
of block
Initial position
of block
 
 
a. Draw a free body diagram for the block when it is at “P.” 
b. Is the magnitude of the net force acting on the block at “M” greater than, less 
than, or equal to the magnitude of the net force acting at “P”?  Explain your 
reasoning. 
c.  i.) Draw a vector representing the acceleration of the block at “P.”   
         If the acceleration is zero state that explicitly. 
     ii) Does the magnitude of the acceleration increase, decrease,  
         or remain the same as the block moves from “B” to “C”?  Explain. 
d. Calculate the coefficient of kinetic friction µ. 
Fig. 11: Problem to study student associational patterns of force and energy. [63] 
Whether or not one accepts any particular associational structure to describe a particular 
knowledge set, what is essential is the central and well-established insight that reasoning 
about any particular question entails a selection, tacit or explicit, from a collection of 
resources. All of these resources are useful in some contexts, or they would not exist as 
resources. Reasoning involves selecting those that are useful in the given situation. Learning 
physics, in this view, largely entails a reorganization of existing resources. For this reason, it 
is critical that educators attend to how students select from, coordinate, combine, and 
transform their cognitive resources. This is the second component of our theory. 
5 Epistemology and Expectations 
My second level of cognitive structure is control. The world we live in is too complex to 
attend to every item in it (whatever an “item” is). Presented with some environmental stimuli, 
individuals respond by parsing the world into pieces, paying attention to some parts and 
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ignoring the rest. This parsing is more than just deciding what to look at: it includes deciding 
what behavior is appropriate in a given situation. There is something “between” our coding of 
sensory input data and our making sense of that data – a control filter that decides what 
knowledge structures are to be activated. Sometimes these decisions are explicitly conscious 
and sometimes they are automatic and unnoticed. This control structure has strong overlaps 
with the traditional ideas of epistemology and expectations but it divides somewhat 
differently than is traditional.* 
Since we are concerned with teaching and learning, students’ ideas about knowledge and 
knowledge construction – what is often referred to as epistemology – are of great importance 
to us. Users of the term “epistemology” often fail to distinguish declarative epistemology – 
knowledge structures that are statements about the nature of knowledge – from functional 
epistemology – control structures that choose how an individual will construct knowledge in a 
particular situation. The failure to make this distinction can lead to substantial confusion 
about the meaning of the term “epistemology.”  
Most instructors are aware that student expectations about what they are supposed to do in 
class can play a powerful and destructive role in creating “selective attention” that limits what 
students actually do in class and what they learn. These expectations interact strongly with 
(and often control) the resources the students have for creating knowledge.  
The cognitive level of control structures provides an appropriate theoretical framework for 
developing models of these concepts. The Maryland Physics Education Group has been 
developing a model of control elements relevant for education based on work done in 
educational psychology [65], sociology [66] [67], sociolinguistics [68], and discourse 
analysis.† [69] Since we are interested in teaching and learning, we will focus on resources 
and control structures associated with building new knowledge.  
Most research on students’ understanding of the nature of knowledge creation in science 
is about what students articulate about the nature of knowledge and learning. There are two 
hidden assumption in much of this work. (1) These articulated statements are fixed, robust, 
and often wrong: “misconceptions” of epistemology.‡ (2) These articulated statements affect 
students’ choice§ of knowledge building tools. Our theoretical framework alerts us to the idea 
that these assumptions may not be correct. For the first, there may be considerable context 
dependence, even in expressed, articulate statements that students make about knowledge and 
knowledge construction. For the second, articulated beliefs may play little or no role in the 
activities in which students choose to participate in order to construct scientific knowledge for 
themselves. The first statement describes declarative knowledge, the second a control activity 
– the selection by whatever means (conscious or implicit) to activate particular knowledge 
structures. These two hidden assumptions conflate declarative and functional epistemology. 
                                                          
*  In any case, these terms are often used in the literature inconsistently. 
†  In this context, “discourse analysis” refers to the analysis of text and how it is interpreted rather than 
to the analysis of conversational interactions. 
‡  Such “epistemological conceptions” are often referred to as beliefs. 
§  Recall that “choice” here and elsewhere in this section refers to neuronal control structures and is not 
intended to imply a conscious action on the part of the student. 
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We need a finer grained analysis of the resources associated with knowledge construction 
and with the control and activation of these resources. There are three components to our 
theory: epistemic resources, frames, and messages. The first idea we need is that there are 
resources for knowledge building. Following Collins and Ferguson [65], we refer to these 
epistemic resources as epistemic games and forms. The second idea we need is that there are 
control structures that manage the activation of associations of these resources. We refer to 
the relevant structure for choosing knowledge building tools as epistemological framing.  
Although framing is a process in the cognition of individuals, it is the individual’s 
response to input from the external world, it depends on input from the physical world, from 
culture, and from social interactions. We therefore need a third idea to analyze the interaction 
between the individual and the socio-cultural environment –communication paths that 
facilitate these interactions. The critical concepts here are the messages and metamessages 
(messages about how to interpret messages) that individuals receive from interactions with 
the world. These three ideas, epistemic resources, epistemological framing, and messages, 
combine to permit a very rich and revealing analysis of student knowledge construction. They 
provide the tools to carry out an “epistemological discourse analysis” – a parsing of the 
process by which students construct knowledge – that allows us to describe and understand 
both what is happening in an individual student and in an interaction between students. 
5.1 Epistemic Resources  
Individuals have a wide variety of resources for constructing knowledge. A small child 
may know what’s for dinner because “Mommy told me” (knowledge as propagated stuff). 
She may know her doll’s name because “I made it up” (knowledge as fabricated stuff). [70] A 
student may “know” that a big car hitting a small car exerts a bigger force on the small car 
than the small car exerts on the big one because “the big one is stronger” (knowledge by p-
prim). We refer to the processes and tools students use to decide they know something and to 
create knowledge as epistemic resources.  
Our theoretical framework reminds us that with any discussion of knowledge resources, 
an understanding of associational patterns (schemas and models) of those resources are also 
useful. Two such structures (introduced by Collins and Ferguson [65]) are epistemic games 
and forms. An epistemic game is a coherent activity that uses particular kinds of knowledge 
and the processes associated with that knowledge to create knowledge or solve a problem. 
Thus a physicist may play a “making meaning with mathematics” game to map a physical 
situation onto a set of equations, manipulate those equations to obtain a solution, take limiting 
cases to check against his intuition, etc.  
An epistemic form is an external structure or representation and the cognitive tools to 
manipulate and interpret that structure. In our complex and technical society, much of the 
information building we do uses a variety of external representations for knowledge 
construction. An abacus, slide rule, free-body diagram, and a position-velocity graph are all 
epistemic forms. When I refer to an epistemic form, I really mean the cognitive structures that 
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we possess for using and interpreting the results of manipulating the structures, but I will 
sometimes talk as if the form is the external structure itself.*  
Collins and Ferguson limit their use of the terms epistemic games and forms to something 
used by experts that we are trying to teach our students to use. We extend the term to include 
activities and tools possessed by or created by students spontaneously. Our use of the terms is 
therefore descriptive as opposed to normative. As an example, consider Veronica’s use of p-
prims to answer the question “explain the behavior of the interference pattern as the 
separation of the slits is varied” that is presented in the transcript in section 4. There I focus 
on the lability of her use of p-prims. Here, I focus on her choice of p-prim reasoning to 
answer the question. The use of p-prims to answer an “explain” question is an epistemic 
resource that I call p-primming. The knowledge and the associated decision to choose to use 
p-primming in a particular problem situation is epistemological. (I will refer to the process of 
choosing to use related p-prims to reason with as making common sense. This is an e-frame as 
described in the next section.) 
As with any knowledge resources, principle 8 in section 3.2 suggests that epistemic 
resources should not be thought of as always available but that they are likely to be activated 
in a context-dependent way. This suggests that we ought to focus on functional rather than on 
declarative epistemology.  
An example of the fluidity of the activation of epistemic resources is given by Hammer in 
his paper in this volume. [71] The incident is observed in an activity in an American 8th grade 
classroom. The class had been studying geology and the teacher had organized the students 
into groups of eight to prepare a poster describing the rock cycle.†  The video data that 
Hammer describes captures the students seeking information in their notes and text, 
struggling with complex words they do not understand. (One student repeatedly refers to 
“Teutonic plates.”) They don’t seem to be making much progress and few students are 
involved. The teacher suggests that they might try to use their own knowledge and 
understanding, rather than trying to look things up. The result is a dramatic shift in the 
students’ behavior. They start describing what they know in their own words and become 
increasingly engaged. Some students who had previously sat silently now fully enter the 
exchange. I would describe this sequence of events by saying that the students shifted the 
epistemic resources that they had activated for solving the problem from by authority to sense 
making.  
One of the most important components for our understanding of learning is the 
epistemological component:  the student’s expectation as to what epistemic resources are 
appropriate to use in an instructional environment. To be able to describe these choices and 
shifts, we need an additional concept: framing. 
                                                          
*  In linguistics, this is referred to as metonymy – letting an associated object stand for something more 
complex; like referring to “the White House” when we mean the American presidency. 
†  A topic in earth science describing the creation of rock from magma through volcanism and the 
absorption of rock to magma through plate subduction.  
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5.2 Epistemological Frames and Framing 
An individual’s expectations activate what she pays attention to and what she ignores in 
response to the 10,000 things and their interactions – a selective filter. A college student has 
had many years of schooling and (thinks) she knows what to expect when she walks into a 
classroom. If the students’ expectations about what they are supposed to do fail to match the 
teacher’s expectations about what the students should do, both may be disappointed. In many 
of the papers in this volume, we find examples in which students have the resources to answer 
physics problems but do not activate them appropriately – and may continue not to do so even 
after it is suggested to them. To understand student expectations and the role they play in 
learning, we introduce the control structure of “framing.” 
The idea of frames and framing was proposed by psychoanalyst Gregory Bateson [66] and 
anthropologist Irving Goffman [67] and used by socio-linguist Deborah Tannen [68] to 
describe how individuals develop expectations that help them make sense of complex world 
situations, especially social ones. According to Goffman, a frame is the individual’s answer to 
the question “What is it that’s going on here?”  Bateson first introduced the idea in the 
context of observing sub-adult monkeys scuffling and nipping at each other. They appeared to 
know the difference when a particular behavior was to be interpreted as play and when the 
same behavior should be interpreted as fighting or aggression. He called the monkey’s 
interpretation of the situation a frame.* Tannen describes a pediatrician discussing a child’s 
illness with the child’s mother in the presence of the child and a tape recorder for the doctor’s 
permanent record. The doctor’s interaction with the three (child, mother, and tape recorder) 
were each carried out in different frames, using different vocabularies, levels of sentence 
complexity, and tones of voice. 
An example of how this works is in what we would call in our current framework, the 
restaurant frames. [72] When you enter a restaurant, you have a variety of resources on 
which you can call. You know how to read a menu, either one printed on paper or displayed 
on the wall (and perhaps you know how to recognize a “daily specials” menu chalked on a 
slate). You know how to eat with your hands or with a knife and fork (and perhaps with 
chopsticks). You know how to pay for your meal with cash or a credit card. When you enter a 
particular restaurant, a variety of sensory impressions lead you to automatically activate a 
subset of these resources together with an expectation that you will carry them out in a 
particular order. Two examples are shown in figure 12. At the left is shown the behavioral 
model activated by entering a fast-food restaurant; at the right, the model activated by 
entering a formal restaurant. Most adults living in cultures that have restaurants of the type 
shown in the examples in figure 12 have all the resources the need to function in either type 
of establishment: but they only activate the appropriate ones in each case. 
                                                          
*  This observation was important at the time, since American psychology was in thrall to a stimulus-
response model of behavior (behaviorism). Many psychologists considered that unobservable mental 
states should not be considered. Bateson’s example was an reasonably clear case where the same 
stimulus led to different responses depending on the animal’s internal mental state. 
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Fig. 12: The behavioral models activated by entering two different restaurants.  
Left: a fast food restaurant; right, a formal restaurant. 
In either case, long-term memory elements are being activated. I refer to the process of 
perceiving, interpreting, and activating a particular set of long-term memories for dealing 
with a situation as framing. 
Frames describe an individual’s expectations: they are the way individuals select, 
organize, and respond to the situations in which they find themselves. Framing is part of an 
individual’s cognition but:  
• Framing is carried out by the individual in response to social and physical 
experience. 
• Framing responds strongly to (sometimes subtle) social cues. 
• When interacting individuals frame a situation differently, it can cause serious 
communication problems. 
When students enter a classroom, they frame what is going on. This framing process has 
many components:   
• a social component (Who will I interact with and how?),  
• a physical component (What materials will I be using?),  
• a skills component (What will I actually be doing?),  
• an affect component (How will I feel about what I’m going to be doing?), and 
• an epistemological component (How will I learn / build new knowledge here? 
and What counts as knowledge here?). 
Since our primary concern in studying education is understanding teaching and learning, 
the epistemological component of a student’s frame is particularly important to us. Let’s 
consider some examples of students’ epistemological framings and how they can cause 
difficulty in the classroom. 
A student in an inquiry-style Tutorial [64] or laboratory [73] might be asked to “make a 
prediction.”  I have seen students in this situation pull out notes and textbooks in order to find 
the answer when what the instructor wanted and expected was for the student to think about 
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the situation and use their best intuition to create a prediction. Student and teacher had framed 
the situation differently, with the result that the student activated a different epistemic 
resource than the teacher intended (knowledge from authority vs. knowledge as fabricated 
stuff). 
We define an epistemological frame or e-frame as the set of epistemic resources the 
individual assumes is appropriate to carry out the task at hand. Note that we have separated 
epistemic (describing the act of creating knowledge or the decision that something is known 
using various processes) from epistemological (describing statements about how something is 
known or the decision to use particular knowledge construction tools).  
Note also that e-frames can be fluid, evolving to the situation quickly and easily in the 
way that schemas of knowledge resources may change and adapt. In other cases, they can be 
quite rigid. The question as to whether an e-frame is fluid or rigid is analogous to the question 
as to whether some associational knowledge pattern is modular or a model. Which it is needs 
to be determined empirically in particular situations. The potential (and common) fluidity of 
e-frames implies that a student might e-frame different parts of the class differently. 
5.2.1 Example: A student’s e-frame makes a difference in how they learn 
Paying attention to epistemic resources and epistemological frames helps us be aware that 
a student’s difficulty with a particular problem or activity might not be associated with the 
student’s knowledge but with the student’s framing of the situation. We saw an example of 
this at Maryland when we observed a group of students working together on a UW Tutorial 
[64, p. 155]. Tutorials are group activities in which students work together in a guided fashion 
(with worksheets) to build qualitative reasoning skills. In the transcript below, a group of four 
students are working through an activity in which the students are being guided to build a 
mental model of the propagation of light in straight lines. This lesson occurred about half-way 
into the second semester. One activity has the students holding a small bulb in front of a mask 
(a black piece of cardboard with a small hole in it) and trying to predict what pattern of light 
and shadow would appear on the screen (a white piece of cardboard) and how the pattern 
would change when the bulb was moved up. The apparatus is sketched in figure 13. Veronica, 
Jan, and Claude had not had my class first semester, but they had already had a half-dozen 
tutorial lessons of this type. 
 
Claire: But what’s the normal direction of the light? Cause that’s what I’m asking. 
Veronica: It spans out, and whatever passes through that circle is the part we’re going to 
see. 
Jan: So the light is like that [drawing], and these are the rays, and the vector that points 
that way is going to go through the hole. 
Claire: Ok, so then if you move it up then it’s going to be…? 
Claude:  … [unintelligible]…the light… 
Jan: Right. So like it has…[pause]  
Veronica: Really, it’s just normal. 
Jan: All the rays are going like this. So, it’s kind of like polarized. 
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Veronica: [pause] Mmmm. Not really. [long pause]  It’s just, well, it’s just, guys, you’re 
making it, you’re trying to make it too difficult. It’s just, the light goes out. It only 
goes through that one circle. So, obviously, if it’s down here [pointing to the screen], 
and I’m looking [back towards the light] through that circle… Look. You’re sitting 
down here [pointing to the screen]. You’re looking up through that little circle 
[pointing to the mask]. All you’re going to see is what’s up there. It’s a direct line. 
Jan: [overlapping] Look, I see what you’re saying, right? But I’m just trying to make it 
like physics – physics-oriented. [laughs] 
Veronica: [decisively] It is physics-oriented. That’s just the way it is. 
Jan: [in a low voice] Okay. 
 
 
Fig. 13: Apparatus for a Tutorial in learning to reason about light and shadow. [64] 
In this transcript, one interpretation of what’s going on is that Jan and Veronica have 
framed the activity differently. Veronica has framed it as “making common sense,” while Jan 
has framed it as an “apply formal knowledge” activity. By this, she seems to mean rely on a 
technical vocabulary and don’t worry too much about making sense of what’s going on. This 
is illustrated in figure 14. This view is confirmed by other tutorial videos of this group, by 
Jan’s written homework, and by six hours of interviews with Jan. Those interviews show that 
Jan consistently frames situations in a physics class in terms of formal knowledge that does 
not link to common sense intuitions. [74] They also clearly demonstrate that Jan possesses the 
ability to do common sense reasoning that Veronica does so effectively in Tutorial. But she 
doesn’t feel that it is appropriate in this situation.* This dramatically illustrates that students’ 
difficulties in doing physics the way we want them to may not be in whatever conceptual 
                                                          
*  In the terms expressed by the authors in [74], Jan has created a “wall” between her everyday 
knowledge and her physics knowledge. 
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difficulties or misconceptions they possess but in inappropriate epistemological framing of a 
learning situation. 
 
 
Fig. 14: Framing of behavior models by Veronica (left) and Jan (right) 
 in response to a tutorial activity. 
5.2.2 Example: E-frames can be robust and hard to shift 
A second example of difficulties caused in part by being in the wrong e-frame is nicely 
provided by the work of Mestre and Koch as presented at this school and discussed in 
Mestre’s paper in this volume. [61] In this work, a class of physics students was presented 
with the “two track” problem shown in part (a) of figure 15. Students (especially those with 
some physics training) tend to expect the balls to reach the end at the same time. Mestre and 
Koch have done a nice analysis of the resources the students appear to be using in order to 
come to this conclusion using p-prims and coordination classes.  
 
Fig. 15: The two versions of the “two-track problem” used by Mestre. [61]  
Balls are launched along each pair of tracks with equal velocities  
and the students are asked which ball reaches the end first.  
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During Mestre’s presentation of this result at the summer school, I noticed an additional 
interesting point. Mestre presented the audience with the problem and had us discuss it in 
small groups and make a prediction. (I had seen the problem before. I use it regularly with my 
own students, so I kept silent.) One physicist in my group made the popular incorrect 
prediction that the balls would reach the end of the track at the same time. Mestre drew some 
results from the group and then explained the answer by analyzing the accelerations on the 
tilted parts of the lower track into components. Knowing the relation of acceleration to force, 
one can easily see that the pattern of accelerations leads to the lower ball always having the 
horizontal component of its velocity greater than the upper ball’s horizontal component of 
velocity. It is then obvious that since the lower ball is always moving horizontally at least as 
fast as the upper, and sometimes faster, that it will get to the end first. My colleague smacked 
her forehead and said “of course!” When the second problem was presented, she solved it 
correctly immediately. 
However, when working with a class of students, Mestre reported that presenting the 
analysis into components after the first problem did not help students with the second. His 
interviews suggest that the students continued to use the same kind of qualitative (p-prim) 
reasoning for the second problem that they used for the first and got the same wrong answer. 
Described in our new terms, my colleague framed the first problem as a simple qualitative 
one. Once Mestre activated a new epistemic form for her (vector component analysis), she 
was easily able to bring the appropriate tools to bear on the second problem. The students, for 
whatever reason – lack of comfort with the e-form of vector analysis, perhaps – were stuck 
and could not shift to a more appropriate e-frame. This suggests that there might be 
productive research in exploring what knowledge and associations are needed for a student to 
construct and activate a particular e-frame effectively. 
5.2.3 Example: E-frames can be labile and can manage a group interaction 
Considering epistemological frames can provide insight into the discourse of a group in a 
knowledge-building activity. A nice example is provided in the work of Tuminaro. [75] A 
group of students in algebra-based college physics are observed on videotape working out the 
solution to the problem shown in figure 16.  
 
Three electric charges are placed as shown in the figure. Charges Q1 and Q2  
are fixed in place. Charge Q3 is free to move. As a result of the electric forces 
exerted on it from charges Q1 and Q2, charge Q3 feels no net electric force. 
If the charge on Q2 is q, what is the charge on Q1? 
    
 Fig. 16: A problem in algebra-based college physics. [75] 
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1. Joyce: Well, the distance between Q1 and Q2 and Q2 and Q3, they’re the same, 
right? 
2. Karen: Yeah. I’m assuming so, since they’re both d. 
3. Joyce: [pause] I’m thinking that the charge Q1 must have is negative q. 
4. Karen: We thought it would be twice as much, because it can’t repel Q2 because 
they’re fixed. But it’s repelling in such a way that it’s keeping Q3 there.  
5. Sandra: Yeah. It has to .. 
6. Joyce: [overlapping] Wait… 
7. Karen: [continuing] Like Q2 is – Q2 is pushing this way, or attracting, 
whichever. There’s a certain force between Q2 that’s attracting, but at the same 
time you have Q1 repelling Q3. 
8. Joyce: How is it repelling when it’s got this charge in the middle? 
9. Karen: Cause it’s still acting. Like if it’s bigger than Q2, it can still… because 
they’re fixed. This isn’t going to move to its equilibrium point. So it could be 
being pushed this way.  
10. Joyce: [quickly] Oh, I see what you’re saying. 
11. Karen: Or pulled. You know, it could be being pulled more, but it’s not moving. 
12. Joyce: [non-committaly] Mm-hmm. 
13. Karen: So, we – we were thinking it was like … negative 2q or something like 
that. 
14. Sandra: Yeah. Cause it has to be like big enough to push away.  
15. Joyce: Push away Q3. 
16. Sandra: Yeah. Which we – which I figured out  
17. Carlos: [overlapping] Yeah. I’ve common sense that… 
18. Sandra: [continuing] negative two… 
19. Joyce: Cause it’s twice the distance away that Q2 is? 
20. Sandra: Yeah. 
21. Joyce: [confidently] I agree with that. 
 
This conversation is interesting from a number of points of view. First, the students make 
a number of statements that seem quite peculiar taken at face value, but which become clear 
when considered in the light of the p-prim theory of reasoning resources. In line 8, Joyce 
remarks, “How is it (the charge on the extreme left) repelling (the charge on the right) when 
it’s got this charge in the middle?” If Joyce knows Coulomb’s law (and she does, as appears 
later in the exchange), why should she think that a charge in between Q1 and Q3 has any effect 
on the forces they exert on each other? It seems clear that at this point in the conversation she 
has not activated the epistemic game of “making meaning with equations.” Rather, at this 
point, she and the rest of her co-workers are making common sense – using a combination of 
simple p-prims to try to generate a conclusion. In line 8, Joyce has activated blocking – 
something is in the way of an action and can prevent it. She doesn’t realize that this is 
inappropriate since electric forces aren’t blocked. Interestingly enough, in line 9, Karen does 
not invoke the formal rules for adding electric forces. Rather she invokes another p-prim – 
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overcoming. She states that it (the charge on the extreme left) could still have an effect 
because it could be bigger (than the charge in the middle). Joyce’s hurried response (she says 
line 10 at a faster than normal pace) suggests that perhaps she hasn’t really understood. In 
lines 13 through 21, the group makes a tentative stab at an answer: since Q1 is twice as far 
from Q3 as Q2 is, to balance Q2, Q1 must be twice as big and opposite.   
Many interesting things happen as this discussion continues and as the students (with a 
little assist from the TA) solve the problem. This is described in table 2. 
 
Description of events E-Frame 
Students make some progress using p-prims, but 
are confused about forces and directions. 
making common sense 
with no visual e-forms 
The Teaching Assistant suggests they draw a 
diagram so they can agree on what is happening.  
introduction  
of a new e-form 
They now agree on which charges are exerting 
which forces in which directions and settle on a 
factor of 2. 
making common sense  
with vector diagrams 
Karen, recalling a previous problem tries to get 
them to think using the equation (Coulomb’s law). 
She is ignored. 
attempt to change  
the e-frame 
Eventually, after some additional fruitless 
discussion, she manages to turn their attention to 
using the equation and the group agrees on the 
correct solution to the problem. 
use of formal 
knowledge, equations 
Table 2: Shifting e-frames in a discussion among  
a group of students solving the problem shown in figure 16.  
Although in our theoretical framework e-framing is a cognitive process in an individual, 
we see here that it is useful to describe a group interaction in terms of the overlaps of the 
individuals’ e-frames. Thus, when all the students in the group are tossing about p-prims, we 
can say that the group is in an e-frame in which making common sense is activated. If most of 
the students in an entire class assume that they should be following a protocol in lab and that 
sense-making is irrelevant to the activity at hand, we can say that the entire class is in a from 
authority e-frame (is playing the from authority e-game). 
The three examples in this section show that paying attention to e-framing can be helpful 
in describing how a student is responding to a lesson, a quiz, or a group interaction. They 
point out that, just as knowledge structures may be robust or labile, e-framing may also be 
robust or labile. The cases described here are just a beginning. Classifying student e-frames in 
physics and determining their character for different populations is a major research effort, 
but the preliminary results presented here suggest that it could be a useful activity. 
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5.3 Messages and Metamessages: Negotiating the E-Frame 
The e-frame a student activates can be affected by many elements in the student’s 
environment: the layout of the chairs in the room, a technical word in the statement of a 
problem, etc. What the instructor says is going to happen is of course of primary importance, 
as is what other students say. But it is not only what is said explicitly – the overt message – 
but items in the environment and what is actually done that carry hidden implications for 
telling students what to do – the covert messages. An instructor might say in lecture “It’s 
really important for you to learn the concepts and to make sense of the science you are 
learning.”  That’s the overt message. But if that instructor also gives homework that only 
requires finding the right equation, plugging in numbers, and getting an answer, he sends a 
covert message that contradicts his overt message. If that instructor then only tests for those 
limited skills, he sends a confirming covert message that says, “What really matters is 
knowing the equation. Making sense of it doesn’t matter.” 
Both throughout a class and in extended interactions among students (for example, in 
laboratory or in group problem solving) there are continual exchanges of both overt and 
covert messages that sometimes result in changing which epistemic resources being applied in 
a particular situation. I refer to this process as negotiating the e-frame.  
We saw an example of a group “negotiating an e-frame” in the example above in which 
four students were solving the problem of three charges shown in figure 16. At one point in 
the discussion, the students were having difficulty communicating about what forces they 
were talking about – on which charge, from which charge, and in which direction. The TA 
suggested that they draw free-body diagrams on the board – activate a previously unused 
epistemic form. This resulted in a shift of the group’s e-frame and they made progress 
towards the solution. Later, Karen made a connection the other students had missed: the 
previous problem had similarities to the current problem and it had required the use of formal 
knowledge – the dependence on the force on the distance between charges from the 
Coulomb’s law equation. At first, the other students ignored her. But a bit later, she tried 
again, managed to get their attention, and after some discussion (Joyce still resisting) and a 
prod from the TA, the group began playing the “extract knowledge from an equation” 
epistemic game and solved the problem. 
In a classroom situation, being aware of the predominant e-frame activated by the group, 
the e-frames of individuals that vary from the group, and the stability or lability of those 
frames can help the instructor understand what is happening in her class and formulate plans 
for responding to it. 
When we enter a new classroom situation as an instructor, we may inherit environments 
and constraints that send metamessages that encourage students to frame the class in a 
particular way.*  For example, when students arrives in the classroom shown on the left in 
                                                          
*  This is analogous to the way the set-up of a text can encourage a reader to approach the text in a 
particular way. Thus, a reader picking up Larry Gonick’s The Cartoon Guide to Physics [76] is much 
less likely to read the text line by line, checking each result than she is do it with a Physical Review 
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figure 17, they tend to interpret the layout as a clear metamessage about what frame to 
activate and in which to interpret subsequent messages. Most do not expect to interact with 
friends or the lecturer, most expect to take notes, few expect to think about what is being said 
carefully and to try to understand. In the classroom shown at the right (a SCALE-UP 
classroom from North Carolina State [77]), even on the first day, students will be aware that 
this is not a traditional classroom. They may activate a group-learning epistemic resource or a 
new situation resource but they are unlikely to expect a lecture. 
Once students have framed a situation, depending on the breadth of their experience and 
the consequent robustness of their framing, they may have difficulty interpreting overt 
messages that violate that framing. When substituting for one of my colleagues in a large 
lecture class, I often tell the students that I plan to have activities that will require student 
engagement including thinking, evaluating, and stating their views in public. Very few 
students take me at my word. When I call for a vote on a question, typically only about half 
the students respond. It is only when I call on one of the non-respondents and ask him to 
explain why he was unable to decide on an answer that the students begin to take me 
seriously.  
 
 
        
Fig. 17: Two classrooms that send different metamessages to a student on the first day: 
left, a traditional lecture-style classroom, right, a SCALE-up classroom 
(courtesy R. Beichner). 
Reformed classes often have difficulty in “bringing the students on board.” Changes often 
encounter massive student resistance and unhappiness. Being aware of the difference between 
the students’ framing of our class and our own expectations can help us negotiate a frame 
shift with our students. 
                                                                                                                                                       
article. The cartoon layout sends one framing metamessage about how the text should be treated, the 
technical layout with abstract, references, equations, and appendices sends a different one. [69]  
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6 Implications 
The theoretical frame based on neuro-, cognitive-, and social-science described in sections 
2 and 3, and the resource/framing theories described in sections 4 and 5 have implications for 
education and educational research on a number of levels. In this section, I present a few 
examples of implications for instruction and for research. For some implications of this model 
for assessment, see Bao and Redish. [78] 
6.1 Implications for instruction 
Having a theoretical framework and some theories of how students think about physics 
and respond to the variety of situations they experience in a physics class can help instructors 
interpret what they see and help them design instructional environments more effectively. In 
this section, I describe some examples from my experiences working with a class of students 
at the University of Maryland in algebra-based (college) physics class. The class lasted for 
two semesters of 14 weeks each. There was some exchanging of students between my class 
and the class of other professors between the semesters. There were 2-3 lectures/week (with 
160 students), 1 hour/week small group interaction (20 students) led by a teaching assistant, 
and a 2 hour/week laboratory. This class was a case-study research and development class for 
the NSF-supported project, “Learning to Learn Science: Physics for Biology Majors.” Most 
of the students in the class (~85%) were biology majors and most (~80%) were college 
juniors and seniors (ages 20-22). Almost all (~98%) had completed calculus some years 
before (but had not used it much in the interval). A majority (~65%) had taken high school 
physics. The population was approximately evenly split by gender and most of the students 
were capable of mathematical reasoning but not really comfortable with it. Most expected the 
class to be like their other science courses – predominantly requiring memorizing many facts 
with protocol-guided laboratories and plug-and-chug problem solving. 
As part of the NSF study, the class was extensively reformed to emphasize 
epistemological learning: learning how to learn science.* In my lectures, I adapted techniques 
from Peer Instruction [79] and Interactive Lecture Demonstrations. [80] Small group sections 
were adapted from Tutorials in Introductory Physics. [64] Homework problems were 
complex and the students were encouraged to solve them in groups in an open Course Center 
where TA help was available throughout the week. Laboratories emphasized measurement 
concepts and were not protocol based. In the lab, students worked in groups of four; they 
were given a brief task and had to design an experiment, carry it out, report on the results to 
the class, and evaluate others’ lab work as well as their own. [81] I will relate some examples 
of how our theoretical frame has affected our work in this class in a variety of ways. 
                                                          
*  For descriptions and details of the various instructional methods on which these adaptations were 
based, see [88] and references therein. 
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6.1.1 Learning to listen to students with understanding 
Over my thirty years of teaching, the way I respond to students coming to my office for 
help has changed dramatically. For many years, my response was reasonably consistent. The 
student would ask a question; I would interpret it and respond with an answer and a 5-minute 
mini-lecture on the topic.  
An observation I made of a colleague’s class when I was just beginning to get into physics 
education research provided a wake-up call that began to change the way I respond. I was 
visiting a small public university in the US when a colleague asked me to observe and 
comment on his lecture. I was pleased to agree. He had become a follower of physics 
education research and was trying to use active-engagement techniques in his large lecture 
class. He often called on students and tried to create some discussion (though mostly he still 
just lectured – but with an awareness of the student difficulties that had been described in the 
literature). At one point, he projected a diagram of electric field lines from three charges. The 
figure was quite complex with lines looping and curving everywhere. After he had finished, 
he called for questions. A student asked him to explain why the diagram looked like that. He 
treated the question as a technical one and spent a few minutes explaining why field lines 
never crossed. He asked if the student was satisfied and got a mumbled “Yes” in response. 
I found this event quite thought provoking. Watching the student from behind and trying 
to read the hesitation in his voice and his body language, I felt the student was asking a much 
simpler question: “What’s an electric field and what do those lines mean?” I was convinced 
that my colleague’s technical answer left the student even more confused than he was at first. 
I was interested in the fact that I did not know which of us had interpreted the student’s 
question correctly and I realized that often in my own response to questions I usually assumed 
that I understood what the student was really asking without confirming my interpretation. 
Since then, I have been careful to make it my common practice to respond to a student’s 
question with another question, one designed to clarify for me what the student is really 
thinking and what question the student is really asking. Often I find that a student has 
“technified” the question in order to make it seem he is more knowledgeable about the subject 
than he actually is. I often have to start any explanation I am offering at a lower level than I 
first expect. As I have become more experienced in questioning students, I find that questions 
carefully posed are often better than an explanation. If the student generates the explanation 
himself, he feels better about the physics and is more likely to feel that he can possibly 
answer some questions by himself. 
As I began to learn more about the theory of student thinking, I found that student answers 
that had previously seemed bizarre to me (and that provided me little or no guidance for 
where to go next) now seemed perfectly reasonable. Using my theoretical knowledge, I am 
now more likely to come up with an appropriate response. Let me give you an example. 
About the middle of the first semester, soon after our study of energy, one of my students 
came to my office hours with a complaint. “I understand energy conservation, but I get all the 
problems wrong!” In order to try to get some idea of what was wrong, I responded, “OK. 
Let’s consider the following problem. I’m holding this eraser. If I drop it, is its energy 
conserved?” She responded with a confident and dramatic, “No!” Taken somewhat aback by 
her confidence and apparent lack of confusion in delivering the wrong answer, I responded in 
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a way my students had become accustomed to hearing, “OK. Tell me why you say that.” She 
responded, “Well, it starts out with a large potential energy and as it falls, that gets less!” This 
removed my concern that she didn’t understand potential energy and was only thinking about 
kinetic. But what was she doing?  I probed further. “And what about the kinetic energy?” She 
responded, again confidently and vigorously, “That changes too!” 
Now that was a really bizarre response from a physics point of view. She clearly knew 
what both potential and kinetic energies were and how they both changed. Why didn’t she see 
the conservation? My understanding of the resources we had seen our students use in other 
physics problems came to my aid. Jonathan Tuminaro identifies a resource (primitive) he 
calls feature analysis. This is a resource used in everyday thinking to compare objects and 
decide whether they are equivalent. An example is shown in figure 18. Two cartoon faces are 
drawn. Are they the same? Checking the eyes shows they are a bit different. Is this enough? A 
look at the nose shows they are different too. Putting the two results together is more 
convincing: they are different. I refer to this resource as different plus different is more 
different. This is the resource my student was activating rather than the compensation 
resource I had expected her to use. 
But compensation is clearly a resource that I can expect every college student to have for 
at least some contexts. If I could find a bridging analogy [82] that would activate the 
appropriate resource it might help her. I suggested she consider that she was holding a stack 
of 20 one-dollar bills and that she start handing them to me. As she began to go through the 
motions I asked her, “Is the number of bills you have conserved?” She responded without 
hesitation. “No.” Is the number of bills I have conserved?” I continued. She again confidently 
responded, “No.” I began, “Is the total number of bills in the room…” and she gasped, looked 
up, put her hand to her mouth and said, “Ooooh!” Once she had activated compensation 
instead of the competing feature analysis she was able to make sense of the energy 
conservation situation and answer three or four more similar problems without difficulty. 
 
 
Fig. 18: Feature analysis. Are the two faces the same? A comparison of features gives the 
answer. The more features that differ, the clearer it is that the two are different. [75] 
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I am not suggesting that I would not have been able to come up with an appropriate 
bridging analysis without the resource theory. I hope I would have. But I am quite certain that 
had I not thought about and seen students apply many different everyday resources to physics 
problems – both correctly and incorrectly – that I would have been much more surprised at 
her “That changes too!” and been very confused as to what her problem was. The theory 
helped me make sense of what I was seeing and changed my first judgment of her response 
from stupid/bizarre to “perfectly natural.” 
6.1.2 Situating cognition: Coherence 
The previous example shows how just being aware of the kinds of resources students have 
and that they might or might not activate them appropriately can help you understand some of 
what your students say. Associational patterns are also of great importance.  
A cognitive instructional model that pays a lot of attention to what we would call 
associational patterns in our theoretical framework is the theory of situated cognition. [83] 
This model relies on the idea that in authentic activities in our daily lives we build up 
substantial associational patterns of resources that allow us to solve many complex problems 
– as long as they appear in the appropriate context.  
An example from cognitive research is the problem given by Wason and adapted here in 
figure 19. [84] 
 
A label machine cuts labels and prints a letter on one side (either an A or a B) 
and a number of the other (either a 2 or a 3). It has no other characters and 
never prints anything but these and on the proper side. However, on every label 
that has an “A” it is supposed to print a “2” on the other side. Sometimes it slips, 
however, and makes a mistake on this.  
 
If you are a checker checking labels as they come past you on the assembly line 
out of the machine, which of the following labels flowing past you would you turn 
over to check that they are done correctly? 
 
Fig. 19: A difficult problem. [84] 
This problem is quite difficult, and most people miss it. However, if the problem is 
situated in a context that activates appropriate resources, people can solve it much more 
easily. A more appropriately situated version is shown in figure 20. Using their social and 
cultural knowledge, most adults can solve this problem with no difficulty. 
Both problems are equivalent and have the structure pÆq is equivalent to ~qÆ~p. 
However, the ability to solve the situated version of the Wason problem does not help most 
people solve the more abstract form. The use of compiled, easily activated context knowledge 
to solve situated cognition problems is all very well, but it is not our goal. We want to 
A 3 B 2 
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establish more general solution patterns that work in a wide variety of contexts. How can we 
make use of compiled situated context knowledge but facilitate far transfer, making it useful 
in a wider variety of contexts? 
 
You are managing a group of students who have planned summer research 
travel from your university in Milan. If their assignment is in Europe, they are 
supposed to go by train to save money. If it is in the USA, they go by plane. 
Your secretary gives you a set of cards, one for each student. On one side is 
indicated the student’s destination, on the other whether the student is scheduled 
to go by train or plane. Which cards do you need to turn over to make sure no 
students with European destinations have scheduled to fly? 
 
Fig. 20: A problem one easily solves using situated knowledge. 
One solution that naturally occurs to most physicists is to go abstract. Anyone who knows 
Boolean algebra should realize pÆq ↔ ~qÆ~p and be able to easily solve both problems. 
However, as we have seen, knowing something and activating it in the proper context is not 
as easy as it sounds.  
A nice example of this was given at this school by Mestre in his talk about problem 
posing. [61] In an interview, he gave a good student in calculus-based physics the task of 
creating “end-of-chapter textbook problems” for particular physical situations. In one case, 
the situation was the “half-Atwood’s machine” as shown in figure 21. One of the problems 
posed by the student for this situation was to find the acceleration of the system if both 
masses were equal. The student sketched out a solution but incorrectly identified the tension 
as being m1g. This led to the two masses having different accelerations, a situation that 
troubled the student. His intuition was that if the masses were equal, the acceleration should 
be ½g. (This is good p-prim reasoning!) But in the end, he rejected his intuition and said, 
“Math doesn’t lie!” 
I have seen a similar situation with many of my students. They do not seem aware that the 
mapping of the situation into math could be wrong. Once they have translated the problem 
into an abstract equation, they assume it has to be right. This undermines our attempt to use 
situated cognition as a basis for establishing correct reasoning. 
Paris Plane 
Train New York 
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Fig. 21: The half-Atwood machine used by Mestre in problem posing. [61] 
If we want to make use of the good intuitions our students have – and help them decide 
when their intuitions are good and when they’re not – we have to help them to explicitly 
make connections between the abstract and formal reasoning they are learning and their 
everyday experience. I refer to this process as situating cognition. One way I do this is with 
homework problems that explicitly ask students to make the connection to their everyday 
experience. An example is shown in figure 22. 
 
One day I was coming home late from work and stopped to pick up a pizza for 
dinner. I put the pizza box on the dashboard of my car and pushed it forward 
against the windshield and left against the steering wheel to prevent it from 
falling. (See picture.) Before I started driving, I realized that it could still slide to 
the right or back towards the seat. When driving, do I have to worry about it 
sliding more when I turn left or when I turn right? Do I have to worry more when I 
speed up or when I slow down? Explain your answer in terms of the physics you 
have learned. 
 
 
Fig. 22: A problem to help students situate Newton’s laws in their everyday experience. [85] 
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6.1.3 To Conflict or Not to Conflict: Reconciling 
Traditional reform methods have relied heavily on the cognitive conflict technique when 
students map their everyday experience into a physics class incorrectly. [86] [87] [88] 
Students are asked to make a prediction as to what will happen in a particular situation, 
chosen because it is known that a majority of students will make an incorrect prediction. They 
are then asked to observe an experiment that contradicts their prediction and are helped, 
usually, to understand why it doesn’t work the way they thought it did, but not to resolve the 
conflict with their original idea. 
From our theoretical framework, we see two dangers to this approach. 
1. The students may create an independent knowledge element without modifying 
their original knowledge element. 
2. The students may be led to cut their experience and physical intuition out of the 
frame they activate for doing physics. 
The first seems to be what Jan did in the example discussed in section 5.2.1. The second 
seems to be what Mestre’s student did in the example discussed in section 6.1.2. Hammer 
cites the case of one of his students who, upon receiving a no-grade pre-test as the first step of 
one of the class’s cognitive conflict lessons, sighed and said, “Here’s another quiz to show me 
how stupid I am about physics.” 
Our theoretical structure’s emphasis on associations and epistemology highlights the 
dangers with an approach that, on the surface, produces impressive gains on limited measures 
(conceptual gains on standardized tests).* We are led to ask: Can we retain the conceptual 
gains produced by the best cognitive conflict methods without doing damage to the student’s 
epistemological framing? 
One method, developed by Andrew Elby, works to shift the method from a conflict 
between the student and authority-taught physics to a conflict within the student himself. Elby 
relies heavily on his knowledge of physics resources to predict how students will respond to 
questions formulated in particular ways. Since resource application is highly context 
dependent, Elby is able to create pairs of questions (Elby pairs) that ask the same question in 
two different ways. In one formulation, the student is likely to answer the question with a 
common misconception.† Students usually get this wrong. In Elby’s second formulation, the 
question is formulated so as to match the student’s intuition. Since students have navigated 
the physical world successfully for more than a decade, their intuitions usually have a thread 
of truth. (For example, students who believe that heavier objects fall faster than light objects 
are inappropriately generalizing their correct intuitions about falling rocks and feathers.) 
Students usually get this second question right. By then showing students that their two 
intuitions are in conflict, he helps them to reconcile their own internal knowledge with the 
                                                          
*  See for example the discussion of various instructional methods in [88]. 
†  There are large collections of such questions in many areas of physics developed by researchers and 
by curriculum developers who use cognitive conflict. See, for example, [79] and the Action Research 
Kit on the CD associated with [88]. 
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physics they are learning. As a result, the students not only learn the physics, but how to 
relate it to their intuitions. They learn to check, evolve, and rely on their intuitive physics. 
A classic example of this technique is given in Elby’s paper introducing the Elby pair. 
[89] Students are well known to have difficulty believing in Newton’s third law. Although 
they can often state the law (especially the “action-reaction” form), they often either don’t 
know what the words mean or don’t believe that the law applies widely. Elby poses the pair 
of questions shown in figure 23. 
 
A heavy truck rams into a small parked car. 
 1. Intuitively, which is larger during the collision:   
  the force exerted by the truck on the car,  
  or the force exerted by the car on the truck? 
 2. Suppose the truck has mass 1000 kg and the car has mass 500 kg.  
  During the collision, suppose the truck loses 5 m/s of speed.  
  Keeping in mind that the car is half as heavy as the truck,  
  how much speed does the car gain during the collision?   
  Visualize the situation, and trust your instincts.  
Fig. 23: An “Elby pair” of questions on Newton’s third law. 
Approximately 75-90% of my students will miss the first question, even after instruction. 
But question 2 is correctly answered by 90% of my students. Elby has phrased the question so 
as to activate a proportional scaling p-prim. We then analyze the implication of the two 
answers through a reconciliation diagram such as the one shown in figure 24. The first step is 
to identify the core or “raw” intuition that leads to both results. In the case of the third law 
problems, many students will respond that “the car reacts much more than the truck does.” 
When the students figure out that the Newton’s second law allows the car to accelerate twice 
as much as the truck, even when the forces are the same, they are much more willing to 
accept the idea of Newton’s third law. When their refined intuition is confirmed by an 
experiment, Newton’s third law doesn’t just become something they have to accept, it’s 
something that makes sense. In my classes, using this technique led to fractional gains on the 
Newton’s third law cluster of question on the Force Concept Inventory comparable to those 
obtained with cognitive conflict Tutorials (~75-85%) but without the loss of epistemological 
sophistication typically found in introductory physics. * Creating Elby pairs is greatly 
facilitated by the resource theory based on p-prims and modular responses. 
 
   
                                                          
*  For gains on the FCI Newton 3 cluster arising from cognitive conflict Tutorials, see [90]. 
Epistemological sophistication is measured by the Maryland Physics Expectations Survey (MPEX). 
[91] This is a broad survey, so it is not responding solely to this lesson, but to the whole package of 
epistemological modifications. Typical classes show pre-to-post losses on the MPEX, even reformed 
classes that produce good conceptual gains. Our modified classes show a strong gain on this measure. 
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Fig. 24: An Elby reconciliation diagram resulting from the discussion with students of their 
responses to an Elby pair of questions. [89] 
6.2 Implications for research 
Besides having implications for instruction, working with a theoretical framework such as 
the one described in this paper can have significant impact on our research as well. It provides 
us with an understanding of the range of possible interpretations for our observations of 
student’s behavior. To illustrate this point, I describe two examples from the research of the 
group at the University of Washington and one from the research of the group at the 
University of Maryland. 
The group at the University of Washington has a long history of studying student 
difficulties with learning physics at the college level. They have studied topics ranging from 
the concept of density and mass to relativity and wave functions in quantum mechanics. They 
have documented many specific student difficulties, some of which are interesting to analyze 
from a theoretical point of view. 
One such case that was discussed by Heron at her talks in this school occurs in Ortiz’s 
study of student difficulties with torque and the statics of extended objects. [92] After 
instruction, students were shown a picture of an irregular wooden object (a baseball bat)  on 
which the center of mass was marked and a finger was shown balancing the bat above that 
point as shown in figure 25. Most students stated without hesitation that the masses on both 
sides were equal. When asked, they made statements about balancing, some mentioned 
torque, and one student said, “That’s what center of mass means.” 
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 A baseball bat is balanced at its center of mass shown by a cross.  
 Is there more mass to the left of the cross, to the right of the cross,  
 or are the amounts equal? 
 
Fig. 25: A problem posed by Ortiz and  
the Physics Education Group at the University of Washington. [92]. 
This raises some interesting questions. How should we interpret this result? Do we believe 
that the students do not understand torque and the balance condition? We might then try to 
remedy the difficulty by specific remedial instruction on torque. But what if the issue is a 
framing one? If the students were not yet fully comfortable (had not yet compiled) the ideas 
and procedures for using torque, they may have framed this problem as an easy and “obvious” 
one – a problem where they didn’t need to activate the “hard” physics principles but where a 
p-prim would do just fine. It seems very likely that students would activate balancing in this 
context and, cued by the phrase “center of mass,” map “mass” onto what is balanced. How 
would we know?  
 
Fig. 26: Extension of the baseball bat problem to test 
 the organization of student knowledge structures. 
If the students really thought that the balance point had equal masses on both sides, we 
could test it by posing them a barbell problem – two heavy disks attached through their center 
by a long, light (and strong) rod – in which one disk is twice as thick and heavy as the other. 
If the students believed the balance point principle, we would expect them to say that to 
balance the barbells, you would have to put your fulcrum under the wider disk. (This is 
illustrated in figure  26.) This seems to me unlikely. I would expect that they would activate 
compensation and say, “If the right disk is twice as heavy, you have to balance at a point 
twice as close to the heavy disk.” Such responses in a significant fraction of the target 
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population would provide strong support for students having a modular knowledge structure 
at this stage of their learning this topic. 
A second nice example mentioned by Heron comes from the research of Loverude. [93] 
[94] Students were asked to consider two identical graduated cylinders. Two heavy balls of 
the same size but different masses were put in the cylinders and the cylinders filled with equal 
amounts of water. The students were asked in which cylinder the water would rise higher. 
Many students responded that it would rise higher in the cylinder with the heavier ball. Why 
did they do that? The cylinder problem seems trivial on the surface. Failure here might signify 
a serious problem with the concept of volume, mass, or displacement. This might be true for 
some students. But we might consider some other options suggested by our theory. 
Depending on exactly how the question is presented, there could be a number of cues that 
could lead to students framing this as a “trivial” question – one that can be answered with 
exam-solving skills rather than with real-world thinking. By the time they reach college 
(especially in the US where high school students take frequent multiple choice tests under 
time pressure), students have had considerable experience performing “triage” on a test – 
finding obvious or easy questions and quickly getting them out of the way. If the students had 
framed this question in that way, the easiest way to solve it is to activate a more is more p-
prim and map it as “more mass” means “more displacement.” As in the first example, having 
an explicit theoretical framework makes it less likely that we are implicitly using a theory as a 
“hidden assumption” without considering a wider range of possibilities. 
Both of these examples show that when we are doing research on student difficulties, 
having a theory of the way students think can help formulate competing hypotheses about 
what the students are doing when they give wrong answers – hypotheses that we might 
otherwise miss. Having a variety of possibilities helps formulate questions that can further 
guide the research, help us understand how to improve our models of student thinking, and 
help us understand how to create effective lessons.  
A third example comes from the research of Wittmann while he was at the University of 
Maryland. As part of a research project to study students’ concept of electric current, he 
interviewed a physics major in her junior year, code-named Sarah. [95] In the interview, 
Wittmann was attempting to explore Sarah’s conceptual knowledge. In a subsequent analysis 
of this interview, Wittmann and Scherr noted that the interviewer’s framing of the interview 
as a probe of conceptual knowledge resulted in his ignoring some interesting information 
about Sarah’s chosen sources of knowledge. [96] From the point of view of obtaining 
information about Sarah’s conceptual knowledge, the interview begins slowly. Sarah seems to 
have initially framed the interview as a test; she is quite concerned about the correctness of 
the answers she is giving and frequently cites authorities (other classes, memorized 
information, texts). As the interview progresses, the interviewer provides some suggestions, 
and, at a critical point, she seems to reframe the interview, beginning to move into an e-frame 
that activates knowledge as fabricated stuff. She uses other ideas and intuitions in new ways 
and combinations (“That's stuff I've never thought about before, and I'm just making up as we 
go along!”) to answer the questions in a way that makes sense to her. Had we better 
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understood the nature of epistemological framing eight years ago, we could have substantially 
improved Wittmann’s understanding of what was happening in his interview at it occurred. 
My examples, the office-hours interaction, the development of effective tutorial lessons, 
and understanding the subtleties of what is happening in a research interview, do not present 
results that are new or that have not been achieved by others. The best teachers, curriculum 
designers, and interviewers often have highly developed skills that allow them to effectively 
accomplish their goals. But learning those skills is often extremely difficult and can take 
years as an apprentice working with a master teacher or researcher. Our goal of “trying to 
study education scientifically” is to find ways to create many more master teachers, 
curriculum developers, and researchers more quickly. Having a way to describe and explain 
what is going on in these interactions has proven to be an excellent way of doing this in a 
variety of fields from art to engineering.  
7 Conclusions 
In this paper, I have begun to outline a theory for studying the teaching and learning of 
physics and have described some models that fit within it. The framework is at present 
focused on the individual, how the individual thinks and how the individual’s thinking 
interacts with her environment. As the models that fit in this theory become better established, 
they must be interfaced and meshed with theories of social and cultural interaction. 
7.1 Summary 
The theoretical framework discussed here is based on structures uncovered in 
neuroscience and cognitive science and the interaction between them. It consists of 
intermediate-level cognitive structures (resources) that are mesoscopic (complex when 
viewed from the neural level but simple when viewed from the level of individual thinking 
and behaving). Broadly, I focus on two sets of structures: associations and controls. Models 
within this framework identify resources, their associational patterns and their context 
dependence. Associational patterns identify which resources go together and controls identify 
the environments and cues that activate particular associational patterns. 
Some of the axes along which models have to be defined include: the robustness of the 
associations (probability of activation in appropriate circumstances), their degree of 
compilation (extent to which they can serve as a single unit in working memory), and their 
degree of integration with other related elements. Within the two structures of association and 
control, I identify some models appropriate for analyzing student thinking and learning about 
physics.  
In the category of association, I identify phenomenological primitives as fundamental 
resources and refine the idea slightly to separate them into abstract reasoning primitives (of 
which there are few) that can be mapped into facets describing specific phenomena (of which 
there are many). [48] This splitting offers some advantage in developing instructional 
environments to help students transform “misconceptions” that are basically inappropriate 
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mappings. One associational structure of resources is discussed here, the coordination class. 
[49] [59] Many more need to be developed. 
In the category of control, I adapt the idea of frames and framing from the behavioral 
science literature. I pay particular attention to learning – the construction of new knowledge 
and the solution of problems. This requires a variety of epistemic resources that are organized 
into associational patterns called games and forms. [65] The control structures that activate 
particular patterns of games and forms are called epistemological frames. 
We then offer a number of examples showing how even at this crude level of 
development, thinking in terms of these theoretical structures can help diagnose student 
difficulties, create new lessons and instructional environments, and clarify issues in research 
at a number of grain sizes ranging from guiding an interview to comparing different theories 
of learning. Although there is much to be done, having a theoretical framework helps on a 
variety of levels.  
7.2 Speculations 
I conclude this paper with two speculations.  First, recall that in section 4.2, I compared 
two common models of associational patterns in student resources in thinking about physics 
that I referred to as the modular and model models. In some ways student knowledge systems 
are disconnected, labile, and chaotic. In other ways it ways, they are rigid and robust. I quoted 
an example from the work of Scherr et al. in which students showed characteristics of both 
models. In the study of complex systems (see for example [97] and references therein) a 
number of examples have been identified where a system can “ride the boundary between 
chaos and stability.” The phenomenon is called self-organizing criticality. There is a certain 
plausibility to the idea that evolution could drive the development of a cognitive system that 
has a certain degree of stability in order to be able to create predictions and a certain degree of 
flexibility in order to be able to respond to novel situations. Thus, it might be appropriate for 
us to seek theories of resource association that are first and foremost, neither model-based nor 
modular but something that balances between them. What that theory would look like, I don’t 
know. 
A second point that is potentially of great importance is affect. By this I mean a 
combination of emotional responses, motivations, and self image. Every teacher knows these 
issues are of great importance in a student’s learning or not learning. The cognitive-
neuroscience interface seems to indicate that there is a significant interplay between emotion 
and rational reasoning. [9] But if anything, emotion is a even a more complex phenomena to 
study than cognition since it involves not only local neural processes but more systemic 
chemical and glandular phenomena as well. At this stage of research the system appears to me 
to be not as well understood as the more direct cognitive processes. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that affect phenomena are of great importance and eventually should be a third branch of our 
theoretical frame, strongly interwoven with association and control. 
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8 Glossary 
One of the difficulties with exploring the education and cognitive literatures is an 
inconsistent use of terms. Commonly used terms such as “schemas” or “mental models” are 
used with different meanings by different authors leading to considerable confusion. Often, 
terms are not defined at all, even by citations to the literature. To try to avoid this pitfall, and 
because this paper introduces many terms that may be unfamiliar to my readers, I include a 
glossary. 
 
Activation – the level of activity of a neuron or set of neurons. When a neuron is activated it 
sends a chain of electrical pulses (action potentials) down its axon. A neuron can be in a 
variety of activation levels. 
Association – two resources (or neurons) are said to be associated when the activation of one 
leads to the activation of the other in some context or set of contexts. 
Axon – a long thin protuberance extending out from a neuron (q.v.). The axon carries 
electrical pulses. The frequency of these pulses carry information. 
Belief – an articulated statement about something or about a state of affairs that affects a 
variety of behaviors relating to that subject. 
Causal net – an ordered associational pattern of resources. 
Chunking – the tight association of multiple resources or knowledge elements so that they can 
be used as a unit in working memory. (cf. compilation) 
Cognitive conflict – an instructional method in which a student’s belief or misconception is 
first activated (often by calling for a prediction) and then challenged by evidence (often 
experimental). 
Compilation – the process by which a group of related knowledge elements become tightly 
associated (perhaps through familiarity and practice) so that they activate reliably and easily 
together and can be used as a unit in working memory. (cf. chunking) 
Constructivism – the belief, common among educational researchers today, that new 
knowledge must be constructed out of existing knowledge, by establishment of new 
associations, transformation, and processing. 
Context – in common speech, the environment in which a task is presented; in our theory, the 
complete activation state of the neurons in a brain when a task is presented to it. To 
understand context, one must decide what parts of those activations are relevant to the task at 
hand and how those activations influence control elements. 
Control – the process by which particular resources are selected for activation instead of other 
resources that might be relevant. Can involve both activation of some resources and inhibition 
of others. 
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Coordination class – an associational pattern of resources involving a readout strategy (q.v.) 
and a causal net (q.v.). 
Covert message – a message that is unintentionally or tacitly sent by a speaker or 
environment, especially one that leads a listener to frame a situation in a particular way. (cf. 
overt message) 
Elby pair – a pair of questions that ask the same physics question in two different ways. In 
one way, the context of the question cues a common student misconception with a high 
probability. In the second way, a different context cues a correct response. The pair of 
questions create a “teachable moment” to help the students reconcile the two responses and 
refine their intuitions to be more in line with accepted scientific descriptions. 
Epistemic form – the cognitive tools to manipulate and interpret an external structure or 
representation useful for building knowledge or solving problems. Often (by metonymy), the 
external structure itself. 
Epistemic game – a coherent activity that uses particular kinds of knowledge and the 
processes associated with that knowledge to create knowledge or solve a problem. 
Epistemic resource – a schema (q.v.) used for constructing knowledge. For examples, see 
epistemic game and epistemic form. 
Epistemological frame – the set of epistemic resources the individual assumes is appropriate 
to carry out the task at hand. 
Facet – a specific statement describing the functioning of a particular phenomenon or system. 
Framing – the process of selecting a subset of information in the environment as relevant and 
the associated activation of appropriate resources to deal with it. 
Fine-grained constructivism – an approach to learning that in a given learning situation asks, 
if new knowledge must be built from old (cf. constructivism), what particular knowledge is 
used and how is it transformed? 
Foothold idea – an assumption that is maintained as a working hypothesis. 
Lesion studies – the study of how an individual’s cognitive processes change as a result of 
particular limited brain damage (usually obtained from stroke or injury). Gives information 
on the extent to which particular functions can be localized in the brain. 
Links – associations (q.v.) between knowledge elements or resources. 
Long-term memory – the part of memory in which knowledge and information are stored in a 
stable fashion. Long-term memory has immense capacity but it may take substantial effort to 
create an item in long-term memory and it may take substantial effort or time to activate it. 
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Mapping – the association of the indeterminate elements in a schema or reasoning primitive 
with specific elements of the world. 
Mental model – an association pattern of cognitive elements that fit together to represent 
something. Typically one uses a model to reason with or calculate from by mentally 
manipulating the parts of the model in order to solve some problem. 
Metamessage – a message sent by a speaker or element in the environment that leads a 
listener to frame subsequent messages in a particular way. 
Misconception – a knowledge structure that is activated in a wide variety of contexts, is stable 
and resistant to change, and that disagrees with accepted scientific knowledge. 
Model – This term is used in a number of senses. In the physics community, it refers to a set 
of coherent assumptions that are intended to explain and help understand a fairly limited class 
of phenomena. It may be held only by a few (or by a single) researchers. Such structures are 
often called theories in education. See also mental model.  
Model model – the model of student thinking (about something – such as a topic in physics) 
that posits that student thinking consists of well integrated coherent and consistent schemas 
that are used in a wide variety of contexts. 
Modular model – the model of student thinking (about something – such as a topic in physics) 
that posits that student thinking largely consists of weakly associated schemas that are highly 
context dependent and poorly integrated. 
Neuron – specialized cells in animals for the collection and processing of sensory data, for 
thinking, and for initiating and controlling muscular activity. 
Ontology – the description of a system in terms of the kinds of objects relevant for its 
description and their characteristics. 
Overt message – what is said explicitly, in particular, a message that is intended to help the 
listener frame the conversation. (cf. covert message) 
Pattern of association – the spontaneous activation of different resources or knowledge 
elements in conjunction with each other in a particular context. 
Phenomenological primitive – a cognitive resource corresponding to a basic statement about 
the functioning of the physical world that a user considers obvious and irreducible. 
P-prim – a phenomenological primitive. 
Priming – the partial or low-level activation of a set of resources by a particular input. Once 
resources are primed they are typically easier and quicker to access than if they are not 
primed. 
Readout strategy – a resource for the interpretation of sensory input in a coordination class 
(q.v.). 
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Reasoning primitive – an abstract reasoning principle such as “more cause leads to more 
effect.” When mapped (q.v.) into a physical system it becomes a facet (q.v.). 
Reductionism – description of a system in terms of the behavior of constituent parts and their 
interactions. 
Resource – a compiled knowledge element, typically one that appears irreducible to the user. 
Since different individuals have compiled their knowledge in different ways, different levels 
of structure may be used as resources by different individuals.  
Schema – a bounded, distinct, unitary cognitive representation or pattern of association that is 
not too large to hold in working memory. 
Spreading activation – the sequential activation of a series of resources.  
Theoretical framework –The education community’s term for a community’s shared and 
shared assumptions. Typically includes both ontological elements (basic components and 
their interactions) and epistemological elements (how one decides one knows something).  
Usually a t.f. is meant to cover a wide range of phenomena. Specific theories (q.v.) or models 
are required in order to generate predictions and explanations in specific cases. Equivalent to 
what is called a “theory” in physics. 
Theory –In the physics community, this refers to a broad general structure of coherent 
assumptions widely believed by a scientific community. In the education community, it refers 
to a set of coherent assumptions that are intended to explain and help understand a fairly 
limited class of phenomena. It may be held only by a few (or by a single) researchers. The 
education community’s use of the term is approximately equivalent to the physics 
community’s use of the word model (q.v.). 
Working memory – the part of memory in which knowledge and information are mixed in 
active thought. Working memory has a limited capacity and items in working memory fade 
and deactivate if not restored by a process such as rehearsal (conscious repetition) or chained 
activation from other elements. 
Zero-friction experiment – an experiment that is carried out to probe a fundamental 
mechanism by suppressing or controlling elements that are typically present in everyday 
examples of the phenomenon being studied. 
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